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Letter dated 20 May 2018 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2360 (2017), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 6 of that resolution, the final report on their work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 27 April 2018 and was considered by the Committee on 18 May 2018.

The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

During the period under review, the security and humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not improve. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted two major factors of concern: peacekeepers across the country faced serious attacks and armed actors continuously used the delay in the electoral process to promote acts of violence.

Armed groups continued to pose a threat to peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), led by sanctioned individual Shimiray Mwissa Guidon, increased its area of influence, recruited child soldiers and had some forms of collaboration with elements of the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the national army. Foreign and local armed groups, such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda and Nyatura, continued to be interconnected in North Kivu Province.

With regard to natural resources and finance, armed groups and criminal networks, including national security officers, continued to use gold and taxation as sources of illegal revenue. The Group noted that, in Bunia and Bukavu, gold sourced in high-risk and conflict areas was exported illegally to Uganda and Rwanda. Smuggling activities in the tin, tantalum and tungsten sector continued to represent an obstacle to the successful implementation of due diligence measures.

In Beni and Djugu territories, civilians faced serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law involving killings and internal displacement. The Group was not able to determine the main perpetrators of these violations.

Several countries failed to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding deliveries of arms and materiel in 2017 to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group noted that FARDC stocks continued to represent the main source of supply of weapons and ammunition for armed groups.

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	4
II.	Armed groups	5
	A. Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda	5
	B. Allied Democratic Forces	8
	C. Mai-Mai Yakutumba	10
	D. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové	14
	E. Mai-Mai Kilalo	18
III.	Natural resources	20
	A. Gold	20
	B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten	25
IV.	Serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights	26
	A. Attacks on civilians in Beni territory	26
	B. Violence in Djugu territory	28
V.	Attacks against United Nations peacekeepers	29
	A. Attacks on United Nations peacekeepers in Beni territory	30
	B. Attacks on, and killings of, United Nations peacekeepers in Fizi territory	31
VI.	Arms	32
VII.	Recommendations	37
Annexes*		39

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is being submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017).

2. In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution 2360 (2017), the Group continued to exchange information with the Panels of Experts on the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.

Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3. The Group notes with appreciation the support and collaboration of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) during the period under review.

Compliance with the Group's requests for information

4. During the reporting period, the Group met with government officials, private sector actors and organizations in six countries (see annex 1). While it transmitted 50 letters requesting information from Governments and companies, the Group received varying levels of compliance with its requests (see annex 2). It expresses regret that during the mandate, the authorities of the United Republic of Tanzania did not make possible a visit to that country. The Group would like to emphasize that lack of cooperation by Member States has impeded its investigations.

Methodology

5. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this was not possible, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources.

6. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are few documents that provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, command responsibility for serious human rights abuses and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony from members of local communities, ex-combatants and current members of armed groups. The Group has also considered expert testimony by government officials and military officers from the Great Lakes region and United Nations sources.

7. During the period under review, general insecurity made it challenging for the Group to visit remote and less secured areas in the country. In certain instances, such as in Beni following the trial of elements of the armed group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and people associated with ADF as well as people who testified against officers of the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), sources were reluctant to speak with the Group.

8. The present report covers investigations up to 8 April 2018.

Political context

9. At the time of preparation of the present report, the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained volatile. The delay in the electoral process posed a significant threat to the country's peace and stability.

10. The Group notes that a number of dynamics relating to the activities of armed groups have emerged as a result of the failure to fully implement the December 2016 agreement.[1] Local armed groups claimed to be mobilizing into coalitions (see annex 3) and sought the support of civilians in areas under their control.

11. The Group is concerned that violence relating to the electoral process might lead to sanctionable acts and therefore believes that efforts to appease tensions relating to the electoral process should be encouraged.

Update on sanctions individuals and entities

12. In September 2017, the Group met with sanctioned individual Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka (CDi.029), commander of Nduma défense du Congo (NDC-R), who surrendered to MONUSCO on 26 July 2017 together with 24 individuals, including 16 minors. Sheka was designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 28 November 2011 pursuant to the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of Council resolution 1857 (2008). Sheka is detained at the military prison of Ndolo in Kinshasa and the Group is aware that his trial will start shortly in Goma. The Group believes that, if Sheka is convicted, it would represent a deterrent to the commission of further sanctionable acts and would constitute a milestone in the fight against impunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Implementation of the recommendations of the Group

13. The Group reiterates that its previous recommendations to improve the security of the FARDC armouries (see S/2017/1091, para. 101 (e)) remain valid because the main source of weapons for armed groups remains FARDC stocks. The Group reiterates its recommendation for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme to avoid the remobilization of ex-combatants (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 181 (a)).

Investigation into the murder of members of the Group in March 2017

14. The Group is aware that two new suspects for the murders of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán were arrested by the Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR) and military intelligence in March 2018. The Group had several exchanges with the senior United Nations official of the follow-on mechanism for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and noted with appreciation the mechanism's approach to the challenges associated with the investigations. On the basis of discussions with various sources close to the case, including Congolese senior justice officials, the Group learned that cooperation between the mechanism and the Congolese authorities has been deficient and that the Congolese security services have interfered with the investigations. The Group reiterates that the perpetrators of the murders of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán, including their support networks and motives, should be identified.

II. Armed groups

A. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

15. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR),[2] a sanctioned entity (CDe.005), continued to be active in parts of North Kivu, especially in western

[1] Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement, signed in Kinshasa on 31 December 2016.

[2] Unless otherwise specified, FDLR refers to FDLR-Forces combattantes abacunguzi, as opposed to any other splinter groups, such as the Rassemblement pour l'unité et la démocratie or FDLR-Soki.

Rutshuru territory, often inside the Virunga National Park. Although significantly weakened over the past 18 years of its existence owing to defections, FARDC operations and breakaway factions, FDLR remained a threat to civilians. During the reporting period, FDLR trained and armed local armed groups known as Nyatura, which extorted the local population and targeted both FARDC positions and other armed groups (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 37 and 38).

Leadership and troop strength

16. Most of the FDLR leadership has remained intact since the previous report (see S/2017/1091, para. 15). According to 11 former FDLR combatants, the sanctioned individual Gaston Iyamuremye (CDi.003),[3] often referred to as the "President" of the movement, was located in Rubare, near Kirama, about 30 kilometres south-east of Kazaroho in Rutshuru territory. Colonel Gustave Kubwayo, also known as Sirkoff, was the military leader of subsector Mediane (formerly subsector Sinai) in Kazaroho, west of Kiwanja and east of the Kanyosha River. The headquarters of sector North, led by Pacifique Ntawunguka (CDi.024), also known as Omega Israel, was located near Tongo towards the Nyamulagira volcano, in a base called Paris. Approximately 200 armed combatants, including some children, comprised the security forces for Iyamuremye and Ntawunguka.

17. Sylvestre Mudacumura (CDi.012), also known as Bernard Mupenzi, the FDLR army commander, changed bases frequently during the reporting period. Some former FDLR combatants stated that, by late 2017, Mudacumura was based in Makomarehe, north of Nyanzalé. Local sources told the Group that the FARDC operation "Rising Phoenix", which was conducted in September 2017, forced Mudacumura to leave Makomarehe and move to Rusave, north-west of Mweso. Only a small mobile protection unit provided security for Mudacumura, but a larger unit, often known as Diamant (formerly Canaan) was based in Makomarehe.

18. On the basis of the testimony of former combatants, there were 600 to 700 FDLR combatants scattered in various bases, mostly near Kazaroho and Makomarehe. This number is also consistent with the Group's previous findings (see S/2016/1102, para. 9). While the troop strength of FDLR has diminished over time, new recruits continued to join, although in relatively small numbers.

Recruitment and child soldiers

19. The Group learned that about 64 recruits completed three months of military training in November 2017. In addition, a former FDLR combatant who left his group in March 2018 stated that at least 100 more recruits were being trained during the first two months of 2018. The Group was unable to confirm this claim. The majority of the recruits were Rwandan, almost entirely from the Rwandan refugee population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although one former combatant claimed that some recruits came from Nakivale refugee camp in Uganda. Congolese men also joined FDLR, although in smaller numbers. Of the 64 men who completed their training in November 2017, 15 were Congolese and the rest were Rwandan.

20. The training centre, located in Kyahemba, just north of Kitchanga, was reported to be under the command of a certain Colonel Gakwere. The centre provided lessons in handling a variety of weapons. Some former combatants claimed that a makeshift training centre also existed in Makomarehe.

21. The Group previously reported on the use of child soldiers in FDLR ranks (see S/2017/1091, para. 16), a practice that has continued according to former FDLR

[3] Also known as Byiringiro Victor Rumuli, Victor Rumuri, Michel Byiringiro, Victor Byiringiro and Rumuli.

combatants. For example, a former military trainer who left the base at the end of 2017 claimed that most of the recruits there were aged between 14 and 18 years. The Group was unable to obtain further information on this. The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a sanctionable act under paragraph 7 (d) of resolution 2293 (2016), as reaffirmed in paragraph 2 of resolution 2360 (2017).

Nyatura armed groups

22. As previously reported by the Group, FDLR combatants provided training, ammunition and uniforms to Nyatura armed group members, especially Nyatura Domi, which reportedly comprises 400 to 500 men, mostly armed and based in the Bukombo groupement in Rutshuru territory. A former FDLR mid-level commander told the Group that the Nyatura Domi and John Love groups provided security for Mudacumura's camp and for the training centre in Kyahemba.

23. Nyatura combatants often attacked combatants from the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD), an FDLR faction that split in May 2016, as well as FARDC. Nyatura combatants also taxed the local population, at times in conjunction with FDLR combatants (see S/2017/1091, para. 17). In early 2018, there were reports of Nyatura Domi and John Love clashing with Mai-Mai Mazembe near Nyanzalé. The December 2017 killing of Nyatura leader Kasongo Kalamo by CNRD in Mweso, Masisi territory, was followed by clashes between members of Kasongo's group and CNRD combatants near Mweso.

24. Nyatura armed groups appear to have used the political agenda of the Collectif des mouvements pour le changement, which is campaigning against the Kinshasa Government and foreign (Rwandan) influence in the shape of CNRD, in addition to defending themselves from Mai-Mai militias. While in practice this might often mean generating income from taxation and extortion of the local population, the political message of Nyatura armed groups might revitalize FDLR as a significant force behind Nyatura, especially given that FDLR combatants are fully aware of its leadership's inability to seriously challenge power in Kigali and its unwillingness to return to Rwanda.

Defections and returns

25. All former FDLR members whom the Group interviewed stated that most remaining combatants in FDLR were unhappy and wished to leave the ranks. This sentiment was illustrated by the relatively large numbers of defections throughout 2017, with at least 80 FDLR combatants surrendering from 1 September to mid-November 2017.

26. According to statistics of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component of MONUSCO, defections increased by 35 per cent in 2017 compared with 2016 (including CNRD combatants, for whom there were no data in 2016). Bad living conditions in the bush, disillusionment with the FDLR leadership and a deadline of 31 December 2017 for Rwandan refugees to return to Rwanda or secure host country residency were some of the main reasons for the defections and large returns to Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda reported more than 11,000 returnees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the first eight months of 2017, compared with 5,800 in all of 2016.[4]

[4] See www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/Rwandan-refugees-rush-back-home-as-status-deadline-looms/1433218-4172374-9iuac1z/index.html.

B. Allied Democratic Forces

27. The Group investigated ADF in Beni territory. Sources reported that 400 to 450 armed elements were scattered in different bases, operating primarily to the south-east and north-east of Beni. The Group previously reported that ADF was continuing to recruit, primarily youth from Uganda (see S/2017/1091, paras. 29 and 30). However, according to various sources, the number of new recruits has been low, with only tens of combatants a year as opposed to hundreds. The Group did not find any evidence of links between ADF and international terrorist organizations.

28. ADF remains an enigmatic armed group. The Group had access to fewer ADF defectors than in the past and responsibility for specific attacks is sometimes hard to determine because other armed groups in the Beni area sometimes mimic ADF tactics (see S/2016/466, para. 186). Such confusion was also apparent in the description of perpetrators of various attacks by witnesses and local sources as "presumed ADF".

ADF bases

29. The Group previously reported the existence of ADF camps in Madina[5] camp (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 53), a grouping of positions approximately 35 to 40 kilometres north-east of Beni, as well as at least three bases located in the Mwalika forest, south-east of Beni. In Mwalika, Irunga served as an important base, with a reception and training centre for recruits coming from the border between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

30. As reported previously by the Group (see S/2016/466, para. 58), in Madina, the main base known as Whisper is the headquarters of ADF, commanded by Seka Baluku. Two former ADF combatants told the Group that Baluku remained the leader of Madina and Hood Lukwago, also known as London, was army commander and Baluku's deputy.

31. Other commanders included Richard Mugisa, also known as Mzee, one of the sons of Jamil Mukulu (CDi.015) (former ADF leader and sanctioned individual), and Fezza Seguja, known for having ties to some local communities between Mbau and Eringeti. Seguja was reportedly in charge of an important base in Madina, a few kilometres north of Mamundioma, which served as a reception point for newly trained recruits coming from Mwalika and a gateway position to Whisper and the entire Madina complex. Other important ADF bases north of the Mbau-Kamango road included Mapobu and Sesele.

32. Apart from Mwalika and Madina bases, local sources have reported ADF troop movements and bases in the Mayangose area between Beni town and the Mbau-Kamango road. A source told the Group that ADF had established a new position in Lahe, Mayangose, in October 2017. An FARDC commander told the Group that there had been a recent gathering of ADF groups in Mayangose following FARDC operations against ADF bases in Mwalika and Madina. At least two local sources told the Group that they had been in contact with armed elements in Mayangose in late 2017 and early 2018. These elements claimed to be part of NALU, referring to ADF-NALU, the name formerly used by the rebels.

33. There had been reports that another armed group, based in Mayangose, consisted of Congolese combatants from the network of ex-Armée patriotique congolaise (APC) groups, including those formerly led by Kawa Seli and Hilaire Kombi and ex-Mayangose militia formerly led by Leandre Kitsa. The ex-APC is the armed wing of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani,

[5] Or Madina III camp, according to one former ADF combatant, after Madina I was destroyed in 2014 during Sukola I and Madina II in 2016 during Usalama 1 and 2.

Mouvement de libération. It is unclear, however, if this group mixed with or operated alongside ADF. The Group previously reported on a group of former APC combatants who had neither demobilized nor integrated into FARDC. It operated near Mwalika, called itself ADF and maintained a relationship with Mukulu, although it had a separate chain of command (see S/2016/466, para. 193).

Operational strength and recruitment

34. On the basis of several interviews, the Group estimated the current strength of ADF groups to be 400 to 450 armed elements, including some women and children. The majority of ADF members were Ugandan, while some 100 to 200 were Congolese. Two former ADF combatants (one Ugandan and one Burundian) told the Group that there were also a small number of Tanzanian, Burundian and Rwandan combatants in ADF.

35. ADF continued to arm and train children, who either were abducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were recruited from neighbouring countries or were born and raised in ADF camps. Two former ADF combatants spoke of young children of 14 and 15 years of age being armed, trained and sent to fight, usually at the front lines.

FARDC operations

36. On 13 January 2018, FARDC launched Usalama 2, a large-scale military operation against armed groups in North Kivu, including ADF. By the end of March 2018, FARDC reported it had taken over five positions in Mwalika. Intense fighting in the last two weeks of January and February 2018 occurred in Mapobu and Sesele, north of the Mbau-Kamango road. According to an FARDC commander, Mapobu was finally overtaken by FARDC (see annex 4) in early March 2018.

37. FARDC suffered heavy losses, with at least 81 dead and 72 injured from 1 January to 8 March 2018, according to internal FARDC documents. According to FARDC and other sources, between 10 and 15 ADF combatants were killed and 4 were captured in the first three months of 2018.

Case study: ADF attack on FARDC base at point kilométrique 28

38. The Group believes that a 16 September 2017 attack against an FARDC base at point kilométrique (PK) 28, about 1 kilometre west of the MONUSCO Mamundioma temporary operating base (TOB), was very likely carried out by ADF.

39. On 16 September 2017, at about 3 p.m., two armed men attempted to abduct a young Congolese man on the outskirts of Mamundioma village at PK 25. The young man ran and reported the incident to the local FARDC base, which deployed a few soldiers and the youngster to show the way. The soldiers and the youngster fell into an ambush and the young man was shot and injured but managed to hide and survive. An armed group pursued the Congolese soldiers to their base, which was then abandoned as the soldiers sought shelter in the TOB manned by members of the Tanzanian battalion. The peacekeepers returned fire and repulsed the attack, with no casualties or injuries to their personnel.

40. The Group interviewed a former ADF combatant injured in the firefight of 16 September 2017, who confirmed that the assailants were part of ADF. He had been left for dead owing to being covered in blood from injuries to his arms and head. Two other ADF fighters who were injured were picked up by their comrades.

41. The same source informed the Group that ADF intended to attack the FARDC position at PK 25 as revenge for FARDC attacks on ADF recruits travelling from Irunga in Mwalika forest towards Madina, crossing the Mbau-Kamango road close to

Mamundioma. The Group was informed that FARDC had attacked an ADF group in the last week of August 2017 in Ngerere, Mwalika. The ADF group split in two before the attack. According to an eyewitness, both groups came from the north-east: one attacked the FARDC position at PK 28, while a second group continued west towards Mbau to try to stop any incoming FARDC reinforcements.

42. The former ADF combatant confirmed that each of the two groups comprised about 50 people, including women and children, and that his group had tried to capture a young Congolese civilian who escaped and later returned with FARDC soldiers. The Group spoke with the young man, who confirmed the story.

C. Mai-Mai Yakutumba

43. The Group conducted investigations on Mai-Mai Yakutumba,[6] a predominantly ethnic Bembe armed group. The Group noted that after being dormant for some years, this armed group had made a resurgence, especially after December 2016 and the postponement of the elections. Its leader, William Amuri, also known as Yakutumba (see S/2015/19, para. 106), managed to unite several small local armed groups and reform an old alliance, the Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC). At its peak, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies controlled large parts of the border area between South Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika Provinces (see annex 5).

44. The Group's investigations also included the military operations of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its allies against the Congolese authorities, its continuous recruitment efforts and its organization of a parallel administration in the heartland of this area to generate income for the movement. Recent FARDC operations have changed the dynamics and taken over most of the territory formerly occupied by Mai-Mai Yakutumba, while its leader Amuri is on the run.

45. Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its leader enjoy some popular and political support for the armed group's display of nationalism and its hostility towards populations perceived as originating from Rwanda, as previously documented. The Group obtained video and audio recordings indicating that Amuri was opposed to a third mandate for President Kabila and has appealed to other armed groups to join him in the fight against President Kabila.

46. The Group believes that, despite the ongoing FARDC operations, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies still have the capacity to reorganize and to continue to be spoilers in the southern part of South Kivu, the northern part of Tanganyika and the southern part of Maniema.

Organization and location

47. Amuri leads the armed group, which consists of a number of semi-independent units. Most of the troops were located near Amuri and his staff in the Ngandja forest and the Ubwari Peninsula (see annex 6). Until recently, he had been based in the vicinity of Kazimia, but since the start of an ongoing FARDC operation, his headquarters has been mobile. At the time of preparation of the present report, he was seen in Lulenge collectivity, in the western part of Fizi territory.

48. According to several ex-combatants, none of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba leaders had assumed formal military grades in the movement and some commanders had regularly switched names, which had made their identification difficult. Amuri's

[6] Unless otherwise specified, Mai-Mai Yakutumba refers to the historical group of combatants affiliated with William Amuri Yakutumba.

deputy was Alonda Bita, also known as Alida. He was in charge of the infantry and recruitment of new combatants. Saidi Ekanda, also known as Dragila or Baleine (see S/2015/19, para. 107), was the commander of the "navy" until he surrendered on 29 January 2018 in Rumonge to the Burundian authorities, who extradited him to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other important individuals in the armed group were the chief of operations, ex-FARDC Colonel Christophe Mukua, also known as Aigle, and the person in charge of finance and logistics, Bavon. The chief intelligence officer was Kitoto Kazuri, who died in December 2017.

49. Besides this core group, several semi-independent entities worked closely together with the main group of Mai-Mai Yakutumba. Since the beginning of 2017 they have intensified their relations with other armed groups in the region, which has de facto integrated the movement. This is the case for the groups of Ebuela, René Itongwa, Shetani, Aoci, Mulumba, Apa na Pale and many others.[7] These small groups had their own leaders but coordinated attacks and received new recruits trained in training camps inside the Ngandja forest. Three ex-combatants confirmed the rotation of troops between Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its allies. Besides local armed groups, Mai-Mai Yakutumba had close relations with Burundian rebels, especially with the Forces républicaines du Burundi (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 45–50). Four ex-combatants and five FARDC officers said that Burundian combatants were integrated in Mai-Mai Yakutumba.

50. On the basis of numerous interviews with ex-combatants, FARDC officers, civil society members and local researchers, the Group estimated that, at the peak of their power, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies had 1,000 to 1,500 combatants in their ranks. At the time of preparation of the present report, the number of combatants had decreased, some of them scattered over a large region. It was estimated that some 200 combatants were still together with the leader of the movement.

Military activities

51. United Nations and FARDC sources documented over 100 attacks by Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies against FARDC positions from January 2017 to January 2018, as well as the killing of an estimated 80 FARDC soldiers. The rise of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies started in December 2016 and increased gradually before reaching a peak in September 2017. Between September 2017 and January 2018, Mai-Mai Yakutumba controlled a significant area of Fizi territory, north Tanganyika and south Maniema. This ended abruptly with the ongoing large-scale FARDC operations.

52. Eight Mai-Mai Yakutumba ex-combatants told the Group that FARDC positions were deliberately targeted to weaken the regime of President Kabila and to recover weapons and ammunition from these positions. Three major attacks on military camps increased the military equipment of the movement significantly. On 1 June 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies attacked the FARDC position in camp Bendera (Tanganyika), looting from the existing arms depot (see S/2017/1091, paras. 95–97). A second major attack was launched on the FARDC position in camp Lulimba on 29 and 30 June 2017. A third major attack was launched on FARDC positions in Kabambare (Maniema) on 7 August 2017 by the Mai-Mai Malaika of Sheikh Assani, an important member of the CNPSC coalition.

53. In early August 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba attacked FARDC positions north of the Ngandja forest, forcing FARDC troops to leave their positions in Kikonde, Kazimia, Sebele and the whole Ubwari Peninsula. Their power reached a climax with an attack on Uvira in September 2017 (see paras. 68 and 69 below).

[7] This list is not exhaustive; unless specified, all these small armed groups will be referred to as Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies.

54. FARDC was regularly ambushed by Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies. Convoys of officers were a frequent target. A Mai-Mai Yakutumba liaison officer told the Group that the convoy of General Philemon Yav, commander of operational sector Sukola II South, South Kivu, was ambushed on 18 January 2018 near Lulimba, when three members of his close protection unit were killed by Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies although General Yav himself escaped injury. The Group witnessed a high-ranking FARDC officer removing his grades because he had to travel from Baraka to Fizi, fearing an ambush by Mai-Mai Yakutumba.

FARDC operations and impact on civilians

55. The Group noted that major FARDC operations against Mai-Mai Yakutumba had not been effective in the past. Since the rise of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies, FARDC had continued to lose positions in Fizi and Uvira territories until the Uvira attack of 27 September 2017, when new FARDC troops arrived to fight Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies. The new troops had quickly recovered the main axes towards Baraka and Fizi from the rebels, although ambushes still occurred from time to time.

56. Several FARDC officers told the Group that they lacked adequate means to control their area of operations. New troops were deployed but without rations or regular salary payments, which had worsened the already tense relationship with the local (Bembe) population.

57. On 26 December 2017, General Yav replaced Admiral Safari as commander of FARDC operational sector Sukola II South, South Kivu. New troops and additional logistical support were provided to embark on a new round of FARDC operations against the rebels. On 21 January 2018, General Yav commenced the operation on three axes south of the Fizi-Baraka region, resulting in a quick victory against Mai-Mai Yakutumba. Some clashes were reported but most of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba infantry withdrew, first to the Ngandja forest and later further inward to the Lulenge collectivity. FARDC regained control over the Ubwari Peninsula and a large part of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba "naval forces" surrendered, including their leader Saidi Ekanda. In a press statement, General Yav claimed that, during the operation, FARDC had captured 133 combatants and killed 48 combatants while losing nine FARDC soldiers. On 9 February 2018, 85 Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants were transferred to Munienze prison (see annex 7).

58. At the time of preparation of the present report, FARDC operations continued with a view to tracking down the leader of the armed group.

59. Ex-combatants, civil society members and politicians told the Group that, after the Uvira attack at the end of September 2017, some FARDC elements had carried out arbitrary arrests of young adults of the Bembe community because they were considered to be Mai-Mai Yakutumba rebels. Men without an electoral card were arrested, while young men with typical Bembe scarification were also targeted. The civil society of the Basimukindje (Baraka) groupement listed incidents against the local population from November 2017 until mid-January 2018, half of which involved FARDC soldiers (see annex 8). Anger at FARDC harassment was an extra incentive for youth to join Mai-Mai Yakutumba ranks. Five ex-combatants told the Group that it was their main reason for joining the Mai-Mai rebels.

Administration and finances

60. During the current Group's mandate, Mai-Mai Yakutumba leader Amuri continued to operate a parallel administration in a large part of his zone of control, more specifically on the Ubwari Peninsula and the coastal area up to Talama. Under the label of CNPSC, Amuri organized his own customs office, migration office and

interior office in Kazimia. The Group documented this parallel administration and the generation of revenues for the movement.

61. Mai-Mai Yakutumba controlled Lake Tanganyika with its "naval forces" and taxed all the traffic on the lake, passengers as well as ships. They set up passenger manifests and inspected ships' cargoes. They used CNPSC paperwork for this (see annex 9). Mai-Mai Yakutumba's own immigration offices issued "laissez-passer" documents for leaving the country and stamped existing Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries circulation papers (see annex 10). The Group obtained an example of the latter with a CNPSC as well as a Burundian immigration stamp (see annex 11).

62. Mai-Mai Yakutumba also organized a taxation system in its zone of control. Ships passing through the controlled zone paid taxes, depending on the cargo (see annex 12). Five ex-combatants and members of the local population told the Group that all passengers of mooring ships paid a tax of 1,000 Congolese francs[8] to come on land. Every week, on market day, the market vendors had to pay 1,000 Congolese francs in order to sell their goods. Fisherfolk were obliged to give 20 fish per pirogue per week to Mai-Mai Yakutumba. Fisherfolk of Baraka who plied the coastal waters near the Ubwari Peninsula were beaten and tortured if they did not want to pay the taxes. Ex-combatants and a resident of Kazimia told the Group that the financial administrator, Bavon, was in charge of this taxation system and that he had a team in charge of collecting taxes in the harbour or at the market place.

63. Mai-Mai Yakutumba also continued to generate income via mining activities in its area of control, in particular in Misisi region (see S/2011/738, paras. 179–183; S/2012/348, para. 59; and S/2014/42, para. 169). The Group did not focus on these mining activities; however, ex-combatants, FARDC officers and politicians confirmed the continuation of Mai-Mai Yakutumba's operations at mining sites.

Recruitment and training

64. Five ex-combatants, four civil society actors and supporters of Mai-Mai Yakutumba told the Group that the armed group actively recruited new combatants. Complaining about President Kabila and the alleged Rwandan supremacy in the region, they convinced many young people in local communities to join the group. Politicians, combatants and local community leaders told the Group that the Bembe community had felt marginalized over the years by the national Government and President Kabila. Another reason for joining Mai-Mai Yakutumba can be found in the harassment of the civilian population by some FARDC elements in the region (see para. 59 above).

65. Three ex-combatants claimed that Alonda Bita had conducted recruitment campaigns for Mai-Mai Yakutumba. Alonda was present in Misisi and Baskalangwa when he recruited a dozen young men and he also offered money to attract youth to join the movement. Some ex-combatants told the Group they had received from 30,000 to 50,000 Congolese francs when they joined Mai-Mai Yakutumba, while others did not receive the promised money. Four ex-combatants said they were forcefully recruited to join the rebels.

66. Sources told the Group that the recruitment campaign was sometimes very successful, attracting several hundred new combatants. Especially after the Lulimba and Uvira attacks, in July and September 2017, respectively, the rebels welcomed a wave of new recruits. Ex-combatants claimed that, in July 2017, there were more than 500 recruits in the training camp in the Ngandja forest. Another training camp was

[8] On 20 April 2018, the official exchange rate between the Congolese franc (CGF) and the United States dollar ($) was: $1 to 1,570 CGF.

situated in Nemba, not far from Nsebele. Training was conducted by former FARDC officers. Saidi Ekanda told the Group that Abika Mandama, an ex-FARDC captain, was the chief training officer; however, the Group could not confirm this information. The duration of the training depended on the time available. In general, most of the ex-combatants interviewed received two months of training before being deployed to a combat unit. However, in some cases the duration of training was as long as six months and in others as short as one week. During training, combatants learned the code of conduct of the movement, how to operate and service their weapons, including AK-47 rifles, PKM machine guns and 60 mm mortars, and received some tactical training.

67. At the time of interview, Saidi Ekanda told the Group that he was aware only of seven children present in the armed group, whereas United Nations officials reported 30 cases of child recruitment in Mai-Mai Yakutumba in 2017.

Attack on Uvira on 27–28 September 2017

68. On 27 September 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba, its allies and the CNPSC coalition attacked Uvira, the second-largest city in South Kivu. FARDC forces were quickly overrun by the attackers, but MONUSCO peacekeepers blocked the rebels at Kulundu port at the entrance of Uvira. On 28 September 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba "naval forces" attacked the city of Uvira from Lake Tanganyika with motorized boats mounted with 12.7 mm guns. MONUSCO attack helicopters retaliated and managed to neutralize three of the four armed pirogues, effectively ending the attack.

69. Ten ex-combatants reported that Ebuela Kibekila, also known as Mutetezi, was the commander of the Uvira operations who led infantry towards the city. Saidi Ekanda confirmed to the Group that he also participated in the attack on Uvira as commander of the naval forces.

D. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové

70. The Group found that NDC-R was one of the largest armed groups active in North Kivu and that it had increased its zone of influence significantly since the Group's last reporting on the group (see S/2016/466, paras. 76 and 77). The name of the NDC-R leader, "General" Shimiray Mwissa Guidon, was added to the sanctions list of the Committee on 1 February 2018 (CDi.033).[9]

71. The Group found that sanctioned individual Guidon was still popular among the local community in Walikale territory owing to his ability to provide security and to defend their interests. At the same time, NDC-R combatants were involved in illegal taxation of the local population, as well as in committing human rights violations against the population. NDC-R took advantage of the lack of the FARDC presence in the region, their own disciplined organization and their relationship with some FARDC elements to control a significant part of North Kivu.

Organization and location

72. In 2014, Guidon had left NDC-R, which at the time was led by sanctioned individual Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi (CDi.029), for "strategic reasons". Since that time, NDC-R had gradually expanded its area of control to include large parts of Walikale territory, significant parts of Lubero territory and small parts of Rutshuru and Masisi territories (see annex 13). In a recent statement (see annex 14), NDC-R claimed to be active in Tshopo and Maniema Provinces as well, but the Group could not verify this

[9] See www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13194.doc.htm.

information. Even without this last claim, NDC-R controlled a zone that was larger than any other armed group in North Kivu.

73. According to a large variety of sources, NDC-R is an armed group that is considered to be well-disciplined and structured. Guidon (see annex 15), together with deputy commander "General" Gilbert Bwira Chuo and his chief of staff, "Colonel" Deo Bafosse Mparanyi, resides in the armed group's headquarters, located in Irameso in Walikale territory. Other important individuals in the movement are cited below, starting with "Colonel" Masiya Sita Tondeze, the T5[10] of the movement. He was one of the main leaders during the attack on Miriki in July 2017 (see S/2017/1091, para. 37) and started the occupation of Kasugho in March 2017. "Colonel" Jean-Claude Kamutoto was the brigade commander in Kasugho, while "Colonel" Kasereka Kifagiyo was the brigade commander in Irameso. Eustache Kabaya Suwamene and Désiré Ngabo Kisuba, respectively the spokesperson and secretary of Guidon, also manage public relations. They travel regularly to Kinshasa, Goma or Beni.

74. Three ex-combatants told the Group that Guidon had a close protection unit of about 90 combatants and that several hundred combatants were present in Irameso. At the time of preparation of the present report, Kasugho in Lubero territory was considered to be the second headquarters of the movement. Several ex-combatants and two civilians told the Group that, at any one time, 150 to 250 combatants were present in Kasugho, with an advanced post in Kagheri comprising 75 elements. Other localities with a significant presence of NDC-R combatants were Bukumbirwa, Bunyatenge, Fatua, Buleusa, Oninga, Mutongo, Fungulamachu and Makokundu.

75. The Group estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,250 active NDC-R combatants.[11] Nine ex-combatants told the Group that the rebel movement operated as a military structure. Every morning, there was a military parade. NDC-R were organized in sections (15 elements), companies (two sections), battalions (four companies) and finally brigades (two battalions). There were at least four brigades in NDC-R, probably more. Four ex-combatants told the Group that they had received a salary during their time in the movement. Some of them were sent to headquarters to deliver tax revenues to Guidon himself in Irameso and to bring back money and the necessary ammunition to their respective positions.

Recruitment, training and child soldiers

76. There were various reasons why combatants joined NDC-R. Four ex-combatants told the Group that they joined the movement voluntarily because of the atrocities committed by FDLR in their villages or against their families. Three other ex-combatants explained that they joined because they were able to earn money and it seemed like an opportunity to improve their lives. Three ex-combatants said they were forced to join the movement on the threat of death.

77. Eight ex-combatants told the Group that they received a basic form of military training. Most of the recruits received a uniform, when available, and learned to operate a weapon. Training was given during the daily parade and morning drill when all combatants were present in the camp.

78. FARDC officers, NDC-R ex-combatants and Walikale leaders told the Group that uniforms and ammunition were regularly sold by individual FARDC soldiers to

[10] The T5 is responsible for relations between military forces and local communities.

[11] There are at least four brigades of approximately 240 combatants in the movement, together with Guidon's close protection unit of 90 combatants, this gives a total of 1,050 combatants. On the basis of these approximate numbers, the Group estimates that there are between 1,000 and 1,250 combatants.

NDC-R. NDC-R commanders wore military fatigues, mostly FARDC uniforms (see annex 16). Ex-combatants said that the commanders had new uniforms while the soldiers had old uniforms, mostly secured during clashes with other armed groups. They did not know where the new fatigues came from. A former agent of ANR told the Group that NDC-R purchased the commanders' uniforms for $30 to $50 per uniform.

79. Ten ex-combatants told the Group that there were many children present in the movement and that several were considered to be combatants. According to MONUSCO officials, there were 46 documented cases of child recruitment by NDC-R in 2017. Guidon, Bwira and Kamutoto were cited as the commanders who ordered these mostly forced recruitments. The Group endeavoured to obtain access to some of the children but did not succeed. Child recruitment is a sanctionable act under paragraph 7 (d) of resolution 2293 (2016), as reaffirmed in paragraph 2 of resolution 2360 (2017). Several ex-combatants and civil society members told the Group that, for the first time, the children in their camps were gathered and summoned to go home in early February 2018. Guidon's having been sanctioned on 1 February 2018 appeared to have triggered some reactions from NDC-R (see annex 17) and Guidon himself. The Group received a letter allegedly from Guidon requesting the President of the Security Council to reconsider this decision. In April 2018, Guidon's spokesperson told the Group that NDC-R never used children.

Clashes with other armed groups

80. The Group also investigated clashes between NDC-R and other armed groups operating near or in the NDC-R zone of influence, including the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), Mai-Mai Mazembe groups and the other NDC faction. It is noteworthy that clashes with FDLR, the primary target of NDC-R according to its cahier des charges (see annex 18), were not regularly reported. Ex-combatants told the Group that there was a shift of priority when FDLR was driven out of Walikale and Lubero territories in early 2017.

81. Most of the clashes reported were against Mai-Mai Mazembe groups and their former allies, known as the Union pour la protection des innocents (UPDI) (see S/2016/466, paras. 78–79). These clashes took place in the western part of Lubero territory near two major villages, Miriki and Kashugo. Dozens of clashes were reported and NDC-R was expanding its zone of influence at the expense of Mai-Mai Mazembe armed groups, resulting in several casualties and internal displacement.

82. In the region of Pinga and Mutongo, on the border between the Walikale and Masisi territories, several clashes occurred with the other NDC faction, under the command of "Colonel" Mandaima. Since the arrest of Sheka, Mandaima has been leading the remaining elements of this armed group. In the same region and especially since the beginning of January 2018, NDC-R was also fighting the APCLS of "General" Janvier Karairi Buingo.

83. The Group did not observe any alliance between NDC-R and armed groups in the northern part of their zone of control after the end of its alliance with UPDI. In the south-western part of Pinga region, local sources saw a close collaboration between NDC-R and APCLS-Mapenzi, a recently formed dissident group of the APCLS of "General" Janvier.

Relationship with FARDC

84. NDC-R maintained control over a large area, with little FARDC presence. The ex-combatants who were interviewed told the Group that there was an important standing order not to militarily engage FARDC or its positions. On several occasions, when FARDC approached its positions, NDC-R combatants had withdrawn; once

FARDC had left, NDC-R returned to its original positions. Ex-combatants also told the Group that some NDC-R commanders regularly conferred with FARDC officers in local bars and discussed the strategy for attacking the positions of other armed groups. This was the case in the Kagheri-Kasugho area and also in the Pinga area, where mixed FARDC-NDC-R patrols were spotted by the local population.

85. At the time of preparation of the present report, the Group did not observe FARDC operations against NDC-R, although the operational plan of FARDC for the first months of 2018 had cited NDC-R as one of the targets of its operations. The Group received an internal FARDC document that mentioned only one incident between NDC-R and the FARDC in the first part of 2018, which was an NDC-R attack on an FARDC position in the Mafilo mining site.

Human rights violations

86. During its mandate, the Group documented several human rights violations committed by NDC-R.

87. The Group interviewed several victims of the brutal enforcement of an established community service activity called *salongo* (see S/2010/596, para. 159; and S/2011/738, para. 453), which was instituted by NDC-R commanders at Kasugho and Kagheri and involved adult men, on Wednesdays, cleaning in the military camp, building houses for the combatants or rehabilitating roads in the region. Those who did not attend to perform such labour were beaten and detained. Several ex-combatants confirmed the use of forced labour. Almost every week, people were punished and imprisoned because they did not participate. Two larger incidents were reported: on 19 October 2017, 22 inhabitants of Kagheri were detained and on 14 March 2018, 100 men of Kasugho were detained. They were only released after having paid a ransom.

88. Others were ordered to transport goods to other NDC-R camps. One victim told the Group that he and 12 others had to travel for four days from Kasugho to Fatua. One girl was injured during the trip and was left behind. They had to carry drinks, medicine and women's clothes. Ex-combatants told the Group that this happened frequently during their time in the movement. Two members of the local population told the Group that, on 12 February 2018, 60 men were seized at random in Kasugho and compelled to carry goods towards Fatua.

89. The Group also interviewed an individual who had witnessed summary executions by NDC-R. He was arrested by NDC-R in November 2017 and remained for two weeks in prison, where he was beaten daily. The Group saw the marks of the beating. During the detention of this witness, all other prisoners were beaten and tortured by NDC-R combatants and the commanding NDC-R officer, "Colonel" Jean-Claude Kamutoto, ordered the killing of six prisoners who were subsequently executed by NDC-R combatants. United Nations sources and members of the local population and of civil society told the Group that summary executions were carried out regularly in the Kasugho region under NDC-R control.

Finances

90. As previously documented (see S/2017/1091, para. 72), the Group found that NDC-R continued to generate revenue from the taxation of individuals and goods, including gold.

91. The Group's sources indicated that NDC-R financed its activities by taxing the population within its areas of operation in several ways, including by taxing every adult within its area of control. The armed group forced adults to pay a monthly fee of 1,000 Congolese francs and issued a "jeton" as proof of payment. The sources

showed the Group the jetons they had paid for in Kasugho before escaping to Lubero, where they were now internally displaced persons (see annex 19). They informed the Group that those found without jetons were either heavily fined or incarcerated. The Group heard the testimony of seven persons displaced in Lubero who had deserted their homes in Kasugho because of forced taxation and torture.

92. In addition, NDC-R compelled artisanal miners in the localities that it controlled to sell their gold to NDC-R at about $25 per gram or less, instead of the market price of about $60 per gram that they would receive from independent buyers. A miner from Kipese, a civil society leader from Kasugho and a Congolese official from Lubero territory informed the Group that gold diggers under the control of NDC-R numbered from 1,000 to 1,500. On the assumption that the armed group purchased gold at $25 per gram from the 1,000 diggers and sold it to middlemen at $60 per gram, the Group estimated the profit that NDC-R could make from a conservative figure of 1,000 gold diggers under its control to be $35,000 ($35 x 1,000 grams) per week or $140,000 per month. The Group confirmed from its sources that middlemen bought gold from NDC-R through the gold market in Kasugho and then sold it in Butembo, following which it would be exported to Kampala, a path consistent with the Group's earlier findings (see S/2014/42, para. 96).

93. In addition to gold diggers being forced to sell their gold to NDC-R, they were also forced to pay taxes in gold, depending on their daily production. This could range from 15 to 35 grams per mining pit per week, depending on the size of the pit and the number of miners operating in a pit.

94. Another form of income source for NDC-R was to tax farmers in its area of operations. Sources informed the Group that the owners of quinine trees were forced to pay $250 to $450 every three to six months as a tax to access their farms. The amount varied depending on the size of the farm and on the arrangements some individual farmers may have had with the NDC-R command structures. The Group could not establish how many quinine farmers were under NDC-R control.

E. Mai-Mai Kilalo

95. The Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo (UPLC) is commonly known as Mai-Mai Kilalo, after its leader Katembo Kilalo, a locally renowned *féticheur* or producer of *dawa*, a potion believed to render combatants invincible (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 56 and annex 24).

96. The Group previously reported that Kilalo's group was responsible for a December 2016 attack in Butembo in which a South African peacekeeper, a Congolese soldier, a police officer and a civilian were killed, in addition to nine UPLC combatants (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 177–179). While Kilalo's troops were believed to be responsible for six different attacks in the town of Lubero between August 2017 and January 2018, the Group could verify only the attack that occurred on 9 January 2018.

97. Two former combatants told the Group that Kilalo's groups had attacked Butembo on 9 January because of their opposition to President Kabila's Government. A public statement released a day before the attack on behalf of UPLC had called for attacks against the Congolese State (see annex 20). At least three Congolese soldiers were killed during the 9 January attack.

98. Kilalo's overall strength has varied over the years. By early 2017, he was reportedly in charge of 200 to 300 combatants (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 57). According to interviews with eight former combatants and other sources, by February 2018, Kilalo commanded 500 to 600 elements based in different positions to the

south-east of Lubero town. In early 2018, Kilalo's groups were spread across at least 10 different bases, ranging from Mushenge, north-east of Kanyabagonga, to Kyaviyonge, east of Butembo and south of Isango-Isoro. Other bases, mostly on the western shores of Lake Edward, included Bihanzi, Bukununu, Kirikiri, Kabinirio, Masereke, Muramba and Ngalukira.

99. While Kilalo frequently moved to most of the bases to avoid capture and to collect money from the taxation of local farmers and fisherfolk on Lake Edward, until at least August 2017 his headquarters was located in Mushenge. Later in 2017, after clashes with FARDC, the headquarters was moved to Kasisi, near Kipese, about 15 kilometres south-east of Lubero. One of Kilalo's most loyal combatants and deputy is "Colonel" Kakule Kitelemire, also known as Saperita, another veteran Mai-Mai member.[12]

100. About 400 UPLC combatants were armed with AK-pattern rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), FN FAL rifles and PKM machine guns. All of the interviewed combatants told the Group that ammunition was often in short supply, and at least three former combatants said that a civilian member of UPLC, known as Kapitula or "*le ministre*", acted as a link between Kilalo and Butembo businessmen who provided financial support to the group. One former combatant told the Group that Kapitula often brought ammunition and weapons from Butembo to UPLC camps.

101. Former combatants told the Group that Kilalo had been working on building coalitions of Mai-Mai groups from Ituri in the north and Rutshuru in the south. The UPLC statement of 8 January 2018 referred to the "Kinshasa government" as an "occupying regime".[13] One former combatant from Bwafasende in Ituri Province, who spent five years with Mai-Mai Simba before joining one of Kilalo's groups, said that, in 2014, Kilalo and Mai-Mai Simba made a pact of non-aggression and exchanged combatants to formalize the alliance.

102. Three UPLC combatants told the Group that Jackson Muhukambuto Paluku, a former FARDC colonel who deserted in February 2017, brought about 75 Mai-Mai combatants from northern Rutshuru, south-east of Lake Edward, to join forces with Kilalo at the end of 2017. Jackson had reportedly already sent a big group in October 2017 to assist Kilalo in responding to an FARDC offensive.

103. Other sources said that about 80 Mai-Mai from the group of Charles "Bokande" Mwandibwa attempted to reach Kilalo's positions on boats via Lake Edward in January 2018 but were thwarted by FARDC. Two former UPLC combatants told the Group that, after a disagreement over the leadership of the combined troops, Jackson and his combatants left Kilalo's bases in February 2018.

104. At the end of September 2017, UPLC combatants attacked and took over the FARDC position in Kipese, controlling also the villages of Kiri Kiri and Kavisege, 20 and 25 kilometres east of Lubero town, respectively. FARDC reinforcements followed a week later, attacking after retaking Kipese and nearby villages. Two former combatants told the Group that they had joined Kilalo's group after brutal FARDC attacks that had left many civilians injured, their property burned or looted. Anger towards members of FARDC and Kilalo's rhetoric of fighting the Kinshasa Government constitute significant reasons why some local youth joined Kilalo's ranks.

[12] Some former combatants have referred to Saperita as commanding his own Mai-Mai group, with Kilalo acting as the group's *fetisheur* only.

[13] The statement issued on 8 January 2018, a day before UPLC attacked Lubero, called for guerrillas (*maquisards*) and State security forces to chase away the occupying criminals from Congolese territory.

105. UPLC attacks against FARDC positions in Kipese and Kitsambiro in January 2018 brought about a renewed FARDC offensive against UPLC bases in February and March 2018. One former combatant claimed that some combatants belonging to NDC-R attacked UPLC bases at the same time as FARDC.

106. Many of the UPLC bases were overrun and over 30 combatants surrendered. Kilalo and most of his top commanders escaped unscathed, reorganized themselves and have been attacking FARDC positions and reclaiming their old bases. On 20 March 2018, UPLC combatants attacked FARDC in Lukanga, 30 kilometres north-east of Lubero, and on 31 March 2018, a new UPLC group was reportedly settled in Musasa, 15 kilometres north-west of Lubero town.

107. All former combatants interviewed by the Group confirmed the presence of children, many as young as 10 or 11 years of age, in each of the UPLC groups. On 21 February 2018, the Group witnessed the transport, via MONUSCO, of at least 13 children, formerly in UPLC, from Lubero to Beni. The young boys were often in charge of carrying and administering *dawa*, the potion that Kilalo usually prepares personally. Older boys, between 16 and 17 years of age, received rudimentary training in weapons handling but were often armed with machetes and knives. After joining, most UPLC recruits, both children and young men, were often prevented from leaving. In the case of most adult males, their identity cards (electoral cards) were burned or kept by the group commanders. Three former UPLC combatants told the Group that they could not live a peaceful life at home without electoral cards, as security agents would consider them to be rebels.

108. Most UPLC groups maintained barriers where they taxed the local farmers trying to access their lands as well as fisherfolk on Lake Edward. For example, in one position in Bukenene, the UPLC group charged fisherfolk 15,000 Congolese francs per week per boat, with at least 30 boats fishing near that position alone. By early 2018, there were at least six such positions near the shores of Lake Edward. All the proceeds from the taxes went to UPLC group commanders, who in turn handed them over to Kilalo. All the low-ranking former combatants told the Group that they received no salary during their time in UPLC.

III. Natural resources

109. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Group conducted field visits in North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika Provinces for investigations related to gold and to tin, tantalum and tungsten. The Group found that certain armed elements and criminal networks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have continued their illegal involvement in the exploitation and trade of these resources.

A. Gold

110. The Group focused its investigations on two of the main gold trading centres in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, as suggested by the Security Council (see S/PRST/2017/23), during its current mandate the Group engaged with various stakeholders to streamline and enhance the control of unwrought gold transported in carry-on luggage.

111. The Group noted that the United Arab Emirates and the Democratic Republic of the Congo started exchanges to improve their cooperation in order to combat gold smuggling. The Group welcomed this initiative in line with its previous recommendation (see S/2017/1091, para. 102), but believes that the initiative will be

sustainable only if all 12 States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) are also involved.

112. The Group previously welcomed the launch of the Initiative pour la transparence de l'or artisanal (ITOA), a Congolese gold traceability system. During this mandate, the Group noted that ITOA had been operational in a pilot phase at a mining site in South Kivu Province since 30 January 2018. The Group therefore believes that its implementation should be monitored.

113. The Group notes that, in addition to Uganda, Rwanda is now becoming a major gold exporter in the Great Lakes region in the amount of 1 ton per month.[14] The Group confirmed that, as is the case with Uganda, the official export route is controlled by Alain Goetz (see S/2009/603, paras. 130 and 154–157; and S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 122–125). Information gathered by the Group showed that a large part of the gold traded by Uganda and Rwanda is sourced fraudulently from neighbouring countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 120, 121 and 128 below).

Bunia

114. During the period under review, provincial mining authorities in Ituri told the Group that Bunia was still an important gold trading centre, consistent with the Group's previous findings (see S/2014/42, para. 171). The Group interviewed 10 Bunia-based gold traders — one *comptoir* owner, six *négociants* and three other gold buyers — who informed the Group that gold traded in Bunia was mainly sourced from mining sites in Mambasa, Djugu and Irumu territories in Ituri Province. The Group noted that most of the mining sites in those areas were not validated.[15] As a result, most of the gold traded in Bunia was illegally sourced and had the potential to contaminate supply chains at its final destination in Uganda and the United Arab Emirates. The main findings of the Group's investigations in Bunia are set out below.

Jean-marc Banza wa Banza

115. The Group received credible information from various sources associated with the gold trade in Ituri Province that Jean-Marc Banza wa Banza, Provincial Director of ANR, was involved in the gold trade. The Group saw a copy of a letter signed by Mr. Banza addressed to the manager of a gold mining site in Djugu territory, in which Mr. Banza requested rights to a pit for gold exploitation. Two government mining officials and two civil society leaders told the Group that, generally, as soon as Mr. Banza was informed about a productive gold mining site, he requested that a pit be given to him. The same sources told the Group that ANR agents were regularly sent to mining sites where Mr. Banza owned the rights to pits. Two government mining officials confirmed the information and added that ANR agents were present at Mr. Banza's sites to ensure that the mineral production was not officially recorded or subjected to taxation.

116. The Group also received credible information about the involvement of Mr. Banza in gold exploitation at the mining site in Watsa territory. The Group stresses that the involvement of security officials in the natural resources sector violates the due diligence standards set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[16] and the Security Council,[17] which were

[14] Alain Goetz confirmed this to the Group.

[15] Only six gold mining sites in Ituri Province are validated as "green" and are thus eligible for legitimate export; they are all located near Mambasa (see annex 21).

[16] See www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm.

[17] See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/due-diligence-guidelines.

incorporated into ICGLR and Congolese legislation.[18] The Group tried to contact Mr. Banza but received no response.

Underdeclaration

117. Two government mining officials told the Group that it was common for *négociants* in Bunia to underdeclare the volume and value of the gold that they traded. According to Congolese law, *négociants* should sell all the gold that they received to official *comptoirs*, but a document obtained by the Group showed that between 2013 and 2017 there was a persistent discrepancy between what Bunia-based official *négociants* purchased and what they sold to *comptoirs*. The Group archived the above-mentioned document at the Secretariat.

118. The Group investigated five of the official *négociants*[19] in Bunia. In 2017, they declared having received at least 1 kilogram each of gold. The Group found that one *negociant*, Edmond Kasereka, declared that he sold about 40 per cent of his gold to *comptoirs* in Bunia or Butembo, while the other four *négociants* claimed that they had not sold any of the gold that they had received in 2017. The Group was not able to meet with the five *négociants* but was told by government mining officials in Bunia that they claimed to keep their gold in reserve. A worker associated with one of the *négociants* told the Group that his boss did not maintain any reserves but rather sold the gold in Uganda. The worker also told the Group that his boss had instructed him not to declare all the purchased gold to the provincial mining authority. While this was a specific case related to only one of the *négociants*, it highlights the need for further investigation. The Group also obtained information from a mining official in Bunia that *négociants* normally sold all their gold illegally. The official could not confirm the existence of gold reserves maintained by *négociants*.

119. The Group was provided with the names of other actors involved illegally in gold trade in Bunia by a worker from a Bunia-based *comptoir*, a government mining official, a gold broker active in Mambasa territory and a Bunia-based broker; the actors identified included Jean Lopa, President of the local Fédération des entreprises du Congo, Exodus Deba (see S/2016/1102, para. 76), Karte and Kirikou. The Group conducted further investigations concerning these individuals and was informed by brokers who worked with a few of them that most of them had been involved in the gold trade for decades but had used gold to finance other businesses, such as gas stations, hotels and real estate. From the information obtained, the Group established that these individuals continued to buy large amounts of gold that they sold mostly to Kampala-based gold dealers.

Smuggling from Bunia to Uganda

120. In the course of its investigations, the Group received detailed information on a gold smuggling route from Bunia to Uganda (see annex 22). Smugglers used the road to Mahagi, where they travelled either by motorbike, taxi or even truck. At the border with Uganda, when they were eventually checked, they bribed customs officials on the Congolese side. All of the Group's informants on this issue confirmed that, in Goli, on the Ugandan side of the border, they were not asked to present papers or explain the origin of gold that they carried. Mahagi is a long-established hub of the smuggling route.

121. Two brokers told the Group that they mainly carried gold from mining sites in Kawa and Monbgwalu in Djugu territory. When they arrived in Goli, they would meet with a broker from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who would accompany them to sell to Kampala-based dealers. One of the brokers told the Group that, until

[18] See, for example, article 27 of the mining code of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[19] Kakule Kahotwa, Edmond Kasereka, Lombela, Banga Ndjelo and Bapu Dirokpa.

February 2018, he travelled to Kampala every two weeks with about 3 kilograms of gold (approximately $132,000)[20] per trip.

Bukavu

122. Bukavu is the main gold trading centre in South Kivu Province. Several people engaged in the mining sector, including government officials, told the Group that most of the gold traded in Bukavu came from the territories of Shabunda, Walikale and Fizi, where armed actors or criminal networks were involved in the supply chain. The Group found that Bukavu-based gold traders generally underdeclared their exports.

123. Official statistics obtained by the Group showed that three *comptoirs* exported 69,738 kilograms of gold from Bukavu in 2017 (see annex 23). The Group, during discussions with four Bukavu-based mining inspectors, confirmed that the official exports represented only a fraction of what was actually leaving the country from Bukavu.

124. Mining inspectors in Bukavu also informed the Group that smuggling was well organized and systematic, involving the use of false documents by official and illegal exporters. The Group noted that this was consistent with its previous findings (see S/2016/466, paras. 151–155). During its investigations, the Group obtained evidence that illustrated the illegal practices in Bukavu (see annex 24).

125. The Group confirmed that, in June 2017, a company known as OBWIN Sarl used fraudulent documents to illegally export gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mining officials in Bukavu told the Group that the company was not officially registered to export gold. In addition, the head of the South Kivu mining division told the Group that he did not sign any export documents for OBWIN during 2017, although his signature appeared on paperwork that OBWIN used to export gold produced in Nyakabindi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,[21] via Cyangugu in Rwanda.

126. The Group's investigations uncovered that, in addition to using forged documents and signatures to export gold illegally from Bukavu, smugglers benefited from the corruption of officials and a lack of enforcement at the border. One customs official and two migration officers told the Group that, every week, they witnessed known smugglers crossing the border with gold and forged export documents. When the Group asked why the smugglers were not arrested, the two migration officers mentioned independently two cases in August and November 2017, when they arrested smugglers only to observe them being immediately released following the intervention of government officials from Kinshasa.

127. The Group also found that controls in Rwanda were insufficient to identify smuggled gold. In fact, customs officers in Rwanda only received and recorded papers presented by gold dealers. Despite the prevalence of forged documents, they did not question the authenticity of the documents presented. Gold dealers received a receipt that they presented at Kamembe International Airport before boarding, but the gold that they carried was not checked at the customs office or at the airport.

128. The paperwork used by OBWIN Sarl in the case mentioned above cited Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as the gold's final destination, but according to two brokers in Kamembe, Rwanda, and three individuals familiar with the gold trade in Bukavu, smugglers usually flew from Kamembe International Airport to Kigali, where they sold the gold to Kigali-based exporters. The Group requested gold production and export figures from the Rwandan authorities but had not received a response at the time of preparation of the present report. During its investigations, the Group received

[20] At the time of preparation of the present report, 1 gram of gold was sold in Kampala for $44.

[21] A validated mining site in South Kivu Province.

reports regarding individuals and networks in Rwanda that illegally bought gold exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Given that it had not yet been possible to confirm all of these cases according to its evidentiary standards, the Group believes these reports should be further investigated.

Airlines and gold carried in hand luggage

129. The Group continued its investigations of gold carried in hand luggage on commercial aeroplanes as a means of smuggling gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and outside the Great Lakes region. The Group focused its investigations on Bukavu and Entebbe airports and found that ongoing practices were consistent with its previous findings (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 110). Furthermore, as suggested by the Security Council (see S/PRST/2017/23), the Group engaged with various stakeholders concerning the control of unwrought gold transported in carry-on luggage.

Patterns for gold smuggling in carry-on luggage

130. Three migration officers based in South Kivu, including one who was stationed at Kavumu Airport in Bukavu, told the Group that gold from areas such as Walikale and Shabunda territories is transported by small planes to Kavumu Airport. The three sources told the Group that gold is carried under *colis valeur* (premium cargo), generally without official documentation. They added that, once at the airport, freight companies bribe security and migration agents to be allowed to collect the gold without restriction. Another migration officer confirmed the bribing of security agents and added that, since crew members are not generally checked, they sometimes carry gold in their luggage and deliver it to traders in Bukavu. In March 2018, at the offices of two freight companies in the city of Bukavu, the Group witnessed traders who had no official affiliation with the gold sector receiving gold sent from Shabunda. The Group inquired from two of the traders where they intended to sell the gold that they had received from the freight company, and they responded that the gold was for buyers based in Cyangungu in Rwanda. The Group was not able to obtain the identity of those buyers.

131. The Group confirmed that, in Entebbe Airport, companies sell empty seats. As previously documented, empty seats are used by smugglers to transport gold concealed in hand luggage. Two individuals associated with the gold sector in Kampala, one Kampala-based gold broker from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and one migration officer stationed at the airport in Entebbe told the Group that, despite the official claim that minerals cannot leave the country without proper paperwork, gold smugglers continue to travel either without documentation or with forged documents. The migration officer and the broker told the Group that the owners of gold being trafficked do not travel themselves but use couriers who fly to Dubai to deliver the gold to buyers there. The two sources added that couriers can operate easily because they bribe customs and security officers at Entebbe airport.

132. Two Ugandan nationals working for two airlines operating from Entebbe informed the Group that they are not requested to check gold in hand luggage. In the course of its current mandate, the Group held discussions with senior officials of eight airlines operating in and out of the Great Lakes region, who said that their primary role in checking passengers was to make sure no one was carrying anything that could jeopardize the security of the plane, a policy focusing almost entirely on weapons and explosives. The Group is of the view that gold transported on commercial aeroplanes should not be banned as it represents a key form of export for responsible artisanal and small-scale mining activity that observes the requisite due diligence guidelines. However, there is a need to address the loopholes related to the illegal transportation of gold carried in hand luggage on commercial aeroplanes.

Suggestions to reinforce the control of gold carried in hand luggage

133. During the period under review, the Group consulted various stakeholders, including major airlines flying from the Great Lakes region. The Group would like to thank OECD, which assisted in this process. The Group believes that additional work should be done to further develop guidelines to help airlines to reinforce their ability to control smuggled gold transported on their aeroplanes.

134. The Group would like to propose two actions to mitigate the illegal transportation of gold carried in hand luggage: assistance to enable airlines to detect smuggled gold and the creation of a mechanism to undertake further investigation and prosecution.

135. On the basis of the documented evidence, the Group is of the view that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) should develop rules to be observed by airlines in order to ensure that gold is not smuggled. The rules should be applicable at all airports prone to smuggling in the Great Lakes region.

B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten

136. The Group investigated cases of the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten, documenting cases on the basis of the evidence collected and the testimony obtained from sources. The Group concluded that the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten continued in a manner consistent with its previous findings (see S/2014/42, paras. 214–216).

137. The Group investigated the violation of the Tin Supply Chain Initiative traceability system of the International Tin Research Institute. The Group notes that the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten also contravenes the due diligence guidelines of the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism and OECD.

138. The investigations concerned the involvement of FARDC and the trafficking of minerals by individuals and entities. The Group points out that it did not witness the presence of armed groups at mining sites. Similarly, the Group neither viewed nor received reports of the involvement of either FARDC or armed groups in the mining of tin, tantalum and tungsten.

139. However, the Group received several cases in which FARDC officers were involved in the violation of the Tin Supply Chain Initiative traceability system for tin, tantalum and tungsten. Sources in the mineral sector in South Kivu informed the Group that some FARDC officers had participated in the smuggling and illegal transportation of minerals, consistent with the Group's previous findings (see S/2016/466, para. 119). Two cases illustrate this. In the first case, in December 2017, FARDC soldiers from Goma attempted to seize control of 1,300 kilograms of coltan belonging to a *négociant* in Numbi, Kalehe territory. The administration of the Numbi mineral sector in South Kivu intervened and sent the minerals to Bukavu (see annex 25). The minerals had been sourced from Lumbishi mines in South Kivu, which by then had not been validated. In this instance, both the *négociant* and FARDC were handling untagged minerals.

140. The Group also sought to understand the intensity of the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten along the Minova-Kalungu axis in South Kivu. According to information from sources, including six motorbike transporters, a senior government anti-fraud officer and a *négociant* operating in South Kivu, the Minova-Kalungu axis was a growing centre of importance for minerals trafficked from South Kivu and North Kivu Provinces. Traditional leaders, artisanal miners, motorbike transporters

and middlemen who were involved in or had experience of minerals trading confirmed to the Group that they often witnessed the transportation of untagged minerals. Others confirmed that they had sold such minerals.

141. On 8 November 2017, agents from the North Kivu division of mines confiscated 26 bags of different types of untagged minerals found in the home of a *négociant* in Kalungu, South Kivu. The origin of the minerals was disputed, with the mineral authorities of North Kivu and South Kivu both claiming ownership (see annex 26).

142. The Group also investigated a case in which 2,300 kilograms of untagged coltan were found by law enforcement officers in Kalungu (see annex 27). According to the two law enforcement officers who intercepted the minerals and a local mineral dealer based in Kalungu, two entities, the Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA), located in Kalehe territory in South Kivu, and the Société minière de Bisunzu (SMB), located in Masisi territory, North Kivu, claimed ownership of the minerals. The Group sought further information from the two entities, but at the time of preparation of the present report, the Group had not received a response.

143. The Group also documented a case in which, on 7 November 2017, mineral security agents intercepted 26 bags of untagged coltan from a *négociant* in Kalungu. However, the *négociant* appealed to have his minerals returned to him (see annex 28). In his appeal, he stated that the minerals were a sample that he had sourced from a new mining site that he had discovered, and that he was taking the minerals for testing to establish their types when he was intercepted.

144. The Group spoke to three independent sources with in-depth knowledge of mineral trafficking between North Kivu and South Kivu, as well as a minerals law enforcement officer in Sake, North Kivu. They all told the Group that Minova and Makelele were the most favoured routes used by smugglers operating in Masisi and Kalehe territories because they were less monitored. The Group interviewed seven motorbike transporters operating independently on the Kalungu-Minova route, four of whom confirmed that they often transported people, mostly young men, possessing varying quantities of minerals from either Numbi (South Kivu) or Rubaya (North Kivu) to Kalungu and Minova.

145. In one instance, a government official with knowledge of the trafficking routes along the North Kivu and South Kivu border described to the Group the routes that traffickers used in transporting minerals from Numbi and Rubaya. The traffickers supplied middlemen in towns of Makelele and Minova, on the shores of Lake Kivu.

146. The Group notes that the above-mentioned cases demonstrate a lack of adherence to the rules of chain of custody tracking from mine site to export, as recommended by ICGLR, OECD and Security Council resolutions. The Group sent official communications to both SAKIMA and SMB seeking additional information on the magnitude of mineral smuggling from their sites. Both companies informed the Group that they would provide detailed responses.

IV. Serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights

A. Attacks on civilians in Beni territory

147. After a relative lull during the first part of 2017, the killing of civilians resumed in Beni territory in September 2017. The number of deadly attacks against civilians increased from mid-January 2018 (see annex 29), immediately after the beginning of FARDC operations in the area (see para. 36 above). As previously reported, since early October 2014 a variety of armed actors have killed hundreds of civilians in Beni

territory. Those responsible included local militias, various ADF factions and various armed actors, including some Kinyarwanda-speakers. Some FARDC officers and troops have also been involved (see S/2015/19, paras. 41–45; S/2015/797, paras. 84–92; S/2016/466, paras. 185–213; and S/2016/1102, paras. 98–102). As in previous years, no armed group has taken responsibility for the recent killings, although ADF is usually blamed for the attacks.

148. The Group focused its investigations on the killings of 26 civilians on the Mbau/Kamango road on 7 October 2017 and on the attacks against Kithevya, Ngite and Mbau in February 2018. The Group conducted fieldwork between January and March 2018 and interviewed various sources, including eyewitnesses. It also obtained photographs of some of the victims and villages attacked and a photograph of a dead assailant. The Group could not, however, identify the perpetrators of any of the attacks.

Massacre at PK 40 on the Mbau/Kamango Road

149. The killing of 26 civilians at PK 40 on the Mbau/Kamango road on 7 October 2017 (see annex 30) constituted the largest death toll of any attack in the area during 2017. The attack occurred two days before the second attack against United Nations peacekeepers in Mamundioma (see para. 166 below), about 12 kilometres away on the same road, and coincided with a series of attacks against FARDC on or near the Mbau/Kamango road. On the same day, armed elements took control of three FARDC positions in the forest nearby and ambushed FARDC at PK 40.

150. According to witnesses and other sources interviewed by the Group, in the afternoon of 7 October 2017, well-armed men dressed in FARDC uniforms apprehended and captured motorcycle taxi drivers and their passengers on the road at PK 40. Other armed men in mixed military and civilian clothes hidden nearby shot at those who tried to escape, but some managed to get away.

151. On the basis of the account of a witness interviewed by the Group and MONUSCO information, the assailants robbed their victims. They also recorded information about each person, including their name and religion. They asked them why they had not converted to Islam and showed the Qur'an to one of them. The attackers shot most of their captives but spared some women and small children. Photos of the dead show that they had been bound and some had been tied together. After the killings, they shot in the air twice, saying that they had killed all the "*kafir*" ("infidels" in Arabic).

152. Before leaving PK 40, the assailants burned about 20 motorbikes (see annex 31). Witnesses said that the assailants spoke local and Ugandan Swahili as well as Luganda.

153. After this incident, local and military officials prohibited access to the Mbau/Kamango road. Although traffic has since been almost non-existent, there have been a few killings of civilians. The closure of the road, which is one of the three lifelines between Beni town and Uganda, has caused significant human, social and economic problems, including the displacement of local populations, who have been deprived of access to their fields, and turning the towns of Kamango and Nobili into enclaves, virtually cut off from all nearby Congolese towns.

Resurgence of attacks against the civilian population in early 2018

154. The Group investigated three attacks near Beni in February 2018. These attacks bore several similarities, including that, some of the assailants wore FARDC uniforms, the assailants included women and children and the appearance and statements of the assailants suggested that at least some of them were Muslim. The

Group was, however, unable to confirm their identities and affiliations or to determine if the same group carried out all three attacks.

155. On 2 February 2018, an armed group attacked Kithevya, 6 kilometres north-west of Oicha, killing seven men, beheading two and slitting the throats of five, and looted homes and a health centre. The assailants allegedly spoke non-Congolese Swahili and Lingala. The local population said the assailants included women and children. The women were dressed in Muslim-type clothing and participated in the looting of houses and shops.

156. One week later, on 9 February 2018, an attack took place at Ngite, a village close to Mavivi, where the main MONUSCO base is located. The unidentified attackers killed eight people with guns and machetes and kidnapped two 12-year-old boys who eventually managed to escape. The assailants spoke in non-local languages and a strange Swahili. They included women wearing Muslim-type clothing and children. According to two sources, the leader, dressed in an FARDC uniform, was called "Docta" and referred to Islam. After the attack, the group headed toward Vemba, the area it had come from. Many sources reported to the Group the presence of armed elements in Vemba since October 2017.

157. On 22 February 2018, an unidentified armed group attacked Mbau, killing two civilians by slitting their throats. Witnesses said the group consisted of men, women and children. One witness specified that this first group of assailants was joined by a second group composed of only men. The men wore FARDC uniforms, in some cases mixed with civilian clothes, and some women wore headscarves. According to one witness, their chief wore a kind of keffiyeh with a headband and a long white dress and held a Koran. Another of their chiefs was called "Al-Qaïda". They reportedly spoke various languages, including Kinyarwanda, Lingala, Luganda and Swahili, and made statements about Islam to someone whom they had kidnapped. As with the attack at Ngite, the assailants came from and returned towards Vemba.

B. Violence in Djugu territory

158. The Group conducted preliminary investigations into the sudden eruption of violence affecting the Hema and Lendu communities in Djugu territory since mid-December 2017. Djugu territory had been the theatre of a conflict between the Hema and Lendu communities from 1999 to 2003, which had caused tens of thousands of deaths. During its mandate, the Group conducted interviews with representatives of each community, MONUSCO staff, prosecutorial authorities and seven individuals detained for their alleged participation in the violence. Although the Group noted some form of organization in the attacks, it did not find any evidence of external actors manipulating the perpetrators.

159. The Group established that this new wave of violence had started on 16 December 2017 in Uzi, in Walendu Djatsi, when a group of Hema badly beat a young Lendu from Tete, in Walendu Pitsi, allegedly for an altercation with an official of the security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stationed there. In retaliation, the day after, a group of Lendu from Tete attacked with machetes two Hema women in the fields of the village of Maze, in Walendu Pitsi, injuring them seriously. This led to a wave of reprisals from 17 to 20 December 2017, notably with Hema elements burning about 80 Lendu houses in Tete, and Lendu elements burning at least six Hema villages. At least six Hema were also killed in Bahema Nord.

160. On 29 December 2017, on the initiative of the Governor of Ituri Province and with MONUSCO support, leaders of each community reached a peace and sensitization agreement. There was a relative lull in January 2018, although tensions persisted.

161. The violence resumed at the beginning of February 2018, with the killing of more than 20 persons in Blukwa and Drodro, leading to retaliations and a spreading spiral of violence to certain areas, notably Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Tatsi and Walendu Diatsi sectors (see annex 32). The violence took the form of the torching of many villages, killings that indiscriminately targeted men, women and children of each community and the massive displacement of the civilian population. In several cases, women and children left their home in anticipation of potential attacks, leaving the men alone in the villages. In mid-March 2018, through the Ministry of Interior and Security of Ituri Province, leaders of both communities signed an agreement to cease hostilities (see annex 33). However, according to two reliable sources, they signed the accord without meeting each other to discuss its contents. Nevertheless, at the time of the drafting, the violence had reduced and displaced people started returning home.

162. At this stage of its investigations, the Group is of the view that there may have been some form of coordination for the attacks. Two sources pointed out the simultaneous timing of some of the attacks, with up to seven or eight attacks against Hema villages occurring at the same time, and the use of Motorola radios. One of the two sources also mentioned the use of call signs and some coordination in transporting looted goods. Furthermore, according to two sources, including a Lendu leader, members of the Lendu community retaliated on a much larger scale to provocations or attacks than did members of the Hema community. Only a few killings were committed with guns, the vast majority being committed with bladed weapons such as machetes, knives, arrows or spears.

163. The Hema leader interviewed by the Group, as well as two Lendu detainees, told the Group that those responsible for the violence belonged to a new church called CODECO, created about three years ago. The Group could not confirm this information. Other sources, including a Lendu leader, told the Group that CODECO is known in the area as the Coopérative économique pour le développement du Congo and was formerly known as CODEZA, an agricultural cooperative. The Group noted that the late president of the cooperative was convicted for war crimes by the Ituri Military Tribunal in 2010.[22]

164. The Group believes that it is necessary to identify and address the root causes of the conflict between the Hema and Lendu, including those resulting from the 1999–2003 conflict.

V. Attacks against United Nations peacekeepers

165. During its mandate, the Group investigated the attacks against United Nations peacekeepers in Beni and Fizi territories (see S/2017/1091, para. 8). As is the case for attacks against civilians in Beni territory (see para. 147 above), attacks against peacekeepers have usually been attributed to ADF. However, the Group received credible information that all three attacks against the peacekeepers in Beni territory were committed by a coalition of armed groups or a recently formed armed network, involving ADF and Mai-Mai elements. The Group believes that further investigation should be conducted to identify the exact perpetrators. With respect to the attacks against the peacekeepers in Fizi territory, the Group found that all three attacks occurred in a zone that was at that time under the control of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies. The Group recalled that attacks against United Nations peacekeepers are a sanctionable act under paragraph 3 of resolution 2360 (2017).

[22] The judgement of the Ituri Military Tribunal is accessible (in French) at https://issuu.com/avocatssansfrontieres/docs/asf_rdc_crimesinternationaux_part6 (last accessed on 14 April 2018).

A. Attacks on United Nations peacekeepers in Beni territory

166. All three attacks targeting the Tanzanian peacekeepers in Beni territory occurred on the Mbau/Kamango road and coincided with a series of attacks against FARDC on or near that road from mid-August 2017. The first attack on United Nations peacekeepers targeted the Mamundioma TOB, at PK 27, on 17 September 2017, when one peacekeeper was killed and another wounded. The second attack, which occurred on 9 October 2017, targeted the same TOB but killed three peacekeepers and wounded 18. The third attack occurred at the Semuliki Company Operating Base (COB) at PK 51 (see annex 34) on 7 December 2017. With 15[23] peacekeepers killed, 43 wounded and 1 still missing, it remained one of the deadliest attacks against peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

167. The Group's investigations encompassed fieldwork in September and October 2017 and in January, February and March 2018 in Beni territory, including a visit to the Semuliki COB and many interviews. During its investigations, the Group collected credible information that a coalition of armed groups or a recently formed armed network, comprising ADF and Mai-Mai elements, was involved in all three attacks against United Nations peacekeepers in Beni territory. The Group is of the view that the strength and professionalism displayed by the assailants during the attacks were consistent with the information provided.

168. One civil society actor in Beni area and one FARDC intelligence officer cited Bongela Chuma as being one of those implicated in the three attacks. The information that Bongela Chuma was one of the 900 prisoners who escaped from Kangbayi prison (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 61) was confirmed by an FARDC intelligence officer, MONUSCO, another FARDC source and a former ADF combatant detained with Bongela Chuma. The latter had served as an imam in the prison. He had links with ADF and had been convicted and sentenced, on this basis, by the Operational Military Court of North Kivu. The Group cannot confirm that Bongela Chuma was involved in the three attacks against the peacekeepers with the same individuals or even the same armed groups. However, the Group noted that the three attacks shared similar characteristics and displayed a level of strength and professionalism that no previous attack from any armed group in the area had showed before.

169. The Group noted, in particular, the tactics used, the number of assailants, their preparation in terms of both training and knowledge of the targets, their demonstrated confidence in their ability to overpower the United Nations peacekeepers, their equipment and the strength of their firepower.

170. The attack against the Semuliki COB is, in this respect, particularly revealing. Indeed, the attack started at about 1730 hours, about one hour after the United Nations weekly resupply helicopter had left the COB, and lasted about 14 hours. Soon after the beginning of the attack, the COB came under heavy fire from assailants positioned in a "U" shape around the COB. The intensity of the assault forced the peacekeepers, at some point during the night, to retreat to one part of the COB, while the assailants entered the COB. The assailants then looted many items, including weapons, ammunitions, other military equipment, food and medicine.

171. Witnesses interviewed by the Group reported the use of weapons such as AK-47s, 12.7 mm machine guns, mortars, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocket launchers, submachine guns, light machine guns, sniper rifles, tracers and hand grenades. Some suspected that night-vision equipment was used as well. The Group could not confirm that all this weaponry was used during the attack — except for RPGs since the Group saw an unexploded RPG stuck in a tree near the COB (see

[23] One of the peacekeepers subsequently died in hospital.

annex 35). Nevertheless, the Group noted the strength of their firepower, which allowed the assailants to pursue combats for about 14 hours, although at some stage the shooting became more sporadic and less intense.

172. The extent and the nature of the casualties further confirmed the strength of the firepower of the assailants: 15 peacekeepers were killed and 43 wounded. The Group also observed that the material damages were significant, including one armoured personnel carrier, five tents and one truck burned. The Group saw multiple bullet impacts on many other items, including the toilets, water tank, mobile water treatment unit, generator and tents (see annex 36).

173. While it was difficult to establish the exact number of the assailants, witnesses cited numbers between 300 and 1,000, most of them estimating the number at about 500. Some women wore head covers. Witnesses heard the assailants say: "We will exterminate the Tanzanians and there will be no survivors this time". When they left the COB, the assailants said: "If you do not leave, we will come back on Sunday". They spoke Congolese Swahili. Witnesses also heard some words in Arabic, such as "*Allah Akbar*" (God is the greatest), "*Takbir*" (Greatest) and "*Amir*" (Commandant). They also heard "*Medina*", which according to some was used as a kind of password between the assailants to identify themselves, thereby indicating coordination among the assailants.

174. A further demonstration of the organization of the assailants was their removal from the COB of the bodies (except for one) of assailants killed in the attack, which was consistent with previous attacks in the area.

B. Attacks on, and killings of, United Nations peacekeepers in Fizi territory

175. During the current mandate, three incidents occurred involving United Nations peacekeepers in Maniema and South Kivu Provinces, a region that was considered to be under the influence of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies. In several public statements, Mai-Mai Yakutumba warned MONUSCO not to work together with the "illegal FARDC troops of Kabila", although it never threatened publicly to attack United Nations forces.

Two helicopter attacks

176. On 20 September 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies[24] clashed with and took over the FARDC position in Pene-Mende, Maniema Province. On 22 September 2017, a United Nations helicopter was deliberately targeted by Mai-Mai Yakutumba and allies. An eyewitness told the Group that, during a tactical flight near Pene-Mende, one Mai-Mai combatant in a group of armed Mai-Mai elements fired at the helicopter. The helicopter was hit in the fuel tank and rear tyre. The helicopter safely landed in Baraka and no casualties were reported.

177. On 5 January 2018, a second incident of a United Nations helicopter coming under fire was reported. During a reconnaissance flight over the Ubwari Peninsula, a bullet struck at the base of the Oryx helicopter. At the time of the incident, the Ubwari Peninsula was fully controlled by Mai-Mai Yakutumba.

[24] In this particular incident, the combatants belonged to the Mai-Mai groups of Aochi, Maheshe and Makindo.

Attack on MONUSCO convoy

178. On 27 January 2018 at about 1300 hours, a United Nations convoy consisting of four vehicles was fired upon by Mai-Mai combatants in Kalonda 2 village, 22 kilometres south of Lulimba. Some 50 combatants fired on the convoy, killing one Pakistani peacekeeper and injuring four others. The United Nations peacekeepers retaliated and estimated that they had killed approximately 14 Mai-Mai combatants. The attackers were armed with RPGs, AK-47s and arrows. The attackers retreated, taking along all of the wounded and killed combatants. The incident took place in a zone where in the recent past other convoys, especially FARDC, had been ambushed.

VI. Arms

179. During the period under review, the Group continued its efforts to trace weapons and ammunition recovered from armed groups, including investigations into the delivery of military materiel to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without notification. During the course of these investigations, the Group discovered instances of countries delivering military materiel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo without notification to the Committee.

180. The Group also continued its investigations into the cross-border transfer of arms and ammunition from Burundi and analysed recent developments related to stockpile management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It found that the cross-border transfer of weapons and ammunitions remained an important source of supply for local and foreign armed groups active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, and consistent with its previous findings, the Group noted that armed groups continued to obtain materiel from the national stock of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, either through targeted attacks on FARDC depots or through the sale or direct transfer of materiel from some FARDC officers.

Arms recovered in the hands of armed groups

181. The Group considers that the possession of weapons and ammunition by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in violation of the sanctions regime. During its investigations, weapons and ammunitions found with armed groups, in violation of the arms embargo, were collected, documented and traced. The Group investigated cartridges collected from materiel recently delivered to the Congolese Government as well as weapons and ammunitions recovered from armed groups, including Mai-Mai Yakutumba and alleged ADF combatants.

182. Following FARDC military operations against Mai-Mai Yakutumba, military materiel was seized and displayed in Uvira, South Kivu, in February 2018. The Group was able to obtain access to and inspect some of the weapons and ammunition recovered (see annex 37), some of which looked old and did not have clear markings allowing for effective tracing; FARDC sources informed the Group that most of the materiel recovered was diverted from national stock.

107 mm Bi-tube Multiple Rocket Launcher Type 63

183. During its inspection of the weapons and ammunitions seized from Mai-Mai Yakutumba, the Group observed a 107 mm Bi-tube Multiple Rocket Launcher (see annex 38). There were no indications or markings on the materiel to allow the Group to trace its exact origins. However, several FARDC officers told the Group that the materiel nicknamed "Ousama or Osama" within the ranks of FARDC, was derived from the existing 12-tube or 32-tube Multiple Rocket Launcher of FARDC, mounted on trailers and known as "Yana". Five high-ranking FARDC officers and two military

intelligence sources informed the Group that the materiel was modified in approximately early 2000 to facilitate its transportation during troop movements. The modifications were completed with the technical assistance of engineers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a FARDC workshop in Likasi, Katanga. The same sources informed the Group that there existed a variety of such materiel within FARDC.

75 mm Recoilless Rifle (Cannon sans recul)

184. The Group observed materiel with characteristics similar to an M20 Recoilless Rifle (see annex 39). The absence of clear markings and relevant signs made it difficult to conclusively determine its exact origins. However, according to FARDC and military intelligence sources that the Group interviewed, the materiel was known as "*solola bien*" within FARDC ranks. It was initially adapted to motorized boats for FARDC naval forces but some difficulties had been revealed. It could damage the boat after firing because of the lack of a support base, forcing troops to use it on the ground instead. The materiel is generally used as a close infantry support weapon. Several FARDC officers and military intelligence sources informed the Group that the materiel was diverted from FARDC stock, mainly during the Mai-Mai Yakutumba attacks on the FARDC camp in Bendera in June 2017. The Group sent a request to the Congolese Government for further details on weapons and ammunitions stolen from Bendera in June 2017. At the time of preparation of the present report, the Group had not yet received a response.

7.62x54R mm Machine Gun, model MG-1M

185. During its investigations in Beni, the Group received a report of a PKM machine gun, model MG-1M with serial number 501104, that had been collected during FARDC operations in Mwalika. The materiel has characteristics similar to materiel produced in Bulgaria. It was allegedly recovered from alleged ADF combatants in Mwalika by FARDC units. The model was produced in 2010 (see annex 40). Several military sources indicated to the Group that such weapons were part of FARDC stock. According to military intelligence sources, four were given per battalion as "*armes d'appui*" for FARDC troops. The Group also observed the same model in the hands of Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants and other FARDC patrols in Bukavu and Uvira.

186. The Group initiated further investigations into the patterns of transfer of the materiel. It sent a request to Bulgaria as a potential country of origin. In their response to the Group's request, the Bulgarian authorities confirmed that the materiel was produced by the joint stock company Arsenal, a Bulgarian company, in 2010. The Bulgarian authorities further confirmed to the Group that the materiel was part of an authorized export shipment by the company in 2013 to the headquarters of the Special Presidential Security Group of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congolese Government received the materiel on 15 June 2013 and issued a delivery verification certificate on 17 June 2013. The application for the licence was accompanied by an original end user certificate indicating the Congolese Government as the end user.

7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 54 mm ammunition

187. The Group documented a variety of ammunition for AK-type rifles. Some has characteristics similar to ammunition produced in Bulgaria, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and Iran (Islamic Republic of) (see annex 41). The Group sent requests to the potential countries of origin identified for further details. It received a response from Bulgaria regarding the 10_96 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition. The Bulgarian authorities informed the Group that the materiel was produced in Bulgaria in 1996, but that by law such records were not retained for more than 10 years. The Group also received a reply from the Russian Federation regarding

7.62 x T-46R mm (188-D) ammunition. The Russian authorities explained to the Group that the joint stock company Novosibirsk Cartridge Plant manufactured rifle cartridges of 7.62 mm calibre with a T-46 tracer bullet and a ballistic cartridge case packed in metal boxes, as well as the 7.62 x 54R mm calibre, in 1987 and 1953, respectively. The Russian Federation further explained to the Group that, given the year of manufacture of the cartridges and the expiration of the normative retention period for the relevant documentation, it was not possible to provide the Group with details on the buyer or the year of delivery.

188. The Group is of the view that the ammunition might have been a legal sale to the Congolese Government and then retransferred from national stock. At the time of preparation of the present report, the Group has not received a response from the remaining countries.

73 mm Round RHEAT-9MA

189. During the inspection of the weapons and ammunitions recovered from Mai-Mai Yakutumba in Uvira in February 2018, the Group observed some anti-tank grenades, model 73 mm Round RHEAT-9MA (see annex 42). The characteristics of the materiel were similar to those produced in Bulgaria.

190. In the course of its investigations, the Group sent a request to Bulgaria. In a response dated 28 March 2018, the Bulgarian authorities confirmed to the Group that the materiel was produced by the joint stock company Arsenal in 2010. It was exported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of a legal sale in 2012 to the headquarters of the Special Presidential Security Group in Kinshasa. The material was exported on 25 October 2012 and the Congolese Government acknowledged receipt of the materiel on 11 December 2012 with a delivery verification certificate. The Bulgarian authorities also informed the Group that the Congolese Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans ordered another consignment of the same materiel in 2013, which was delivered on 28 September 2013 and the Government acknowledged receipt on 18 December 2013 with a delivery verification certificate. This indeed confirmed that the materiel was initially part of the Congolese national stock.

191. The Group sent a request to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for further information as to how and when Mai-Mai Yakutumba came into the possession of such materiel initially destined for the Special Presidential Security Group and has not yet received a response. In April, a senior official informed the Group that he was tasked to collect further details on questions raised by the Group.

Failure to notify

192. During the period under review, the Group uncovered cases of failure to notify the Committee.

China Xinxing Shanghai Import and Export Corporation

193. The Group observed that some FARDC troops deployed across the country had new equipment, including new fatigues and weapons (see annex 43). The Group started collecting information on their origin and determined that, in October 2017, there had been a delivery to the Congolese Government of military materiel, including military helmets, bulletproof vests, military boots and uniforms. The Group obtained information that China Xinxing Shanghai Import and Export Corporation had delivered some of the military materiel at the port of Matadi (see annex 44). China Xinxing is a company that is specialized in the supply of military equipment. The Group sent a request for further information on the delivery, details on the materiel and whether the delivery was notified to the Committee. At the time of preparation of

the present report, the Group had not yet received a response from the Government of China.

194. The Group is not aware of any notification to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017).

Materiel with characteristics similar to that produced in Egypt

195. In the course of its investigations, the Group received information that, in late 2017 and in January 2018, Kader Factory for Development Industries delivered military materiel from Egypt to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including crowd control materiel such as tear gas and various types of ammunition (see annex 45). The Group noted that Egypt had notified the delivery of some materiel in 2012; however, the Group is not aware of any recent notification related to the recent shipment of tear gas. The Group requested further details from the Government of Egypt but has not yet received a response.

196. The Group is not aware of any notification to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017).

Cross-border transfer networks for weapons and ammunition in the Ruzizi Plain

197. The Group continued its investigations into cross-border transfers of weapons and ammunition. It focused on the trafficking network based in Burundi and documented the incursion of elements belonging to RED Tabara, a Burundian armed group active in Fizi territory.

Burundian arms trafficking network

198. As indicated in its previous report (see S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 151–154; S/2017/1091, paras. 90–94), the Group received information on the transfer of weapons and ammunition from Burundi to the Ruzizi Plain. Two officers of the Forces de défense nationale du Burundi (FDN) and two members of the ruling party youth league known as Imbonerakure informed the Group that, in November 2017, a vehicle without a number plate had transported 33 AK-47s, 4 PKM machine guns and a number of grenades to the shores of the Ruzizi River of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Five motorbike drivers who helped transport weapons in the area in the Democratic Republic of the Congo told the Group that, toward the end of January 2018, they assisted three individuals who had travelled from Cibitoke to Mabayi by boat. The individuals were carrying two parcels wrapped in plastic bags, containing ammunition. All three were armed with revolvers. They said they were on mission for authorities from Burundi. The motorbike drivers helped them transport the parcels to the mountains to be delivered to an unknown armed group.

199. Two members of the Burundian militia known as Imbonerakure, who took part in the planning, and two FDN sources with access to information confirmed to the Group that some government officials remained involved in the cross-border activities of armed individuals and the transfer of arms into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2016/466, paras. 42–45; and S/2017/1091, paras. 90–94). The same sources confirmed to the Group that, in early 2016, officials of the ruling party of Burundi, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD), had appointed Manassé Hakizimana to lead a mission to destabilize the anti-government forces active in the Fizi Plain in South Kivu. Manassé worked with a team of 11 combatants recruited among the Imbonerakure. This included Nsabimana Eric also known as Marobe, Cishahayo Donatien, Nduvimana also known as Makwanza, Butoyi also known as 100kg, Birigimana Abdul, Buxene, Muoya Ru, Kireko, Nduwimana Jean Claude also known as 79, Bakenga Asmani and Manassé. The

sources further informed the Group that, following the death of Manassé in the Fizi Plain in March 2017, some CNDD officials had convened a meeting to set up a commission composed of high-level government officials.

RED Tabara crossing with arms and ammunitions in violations of the embargo

200. In late June 2017, near Kalongwe in South Kivu, FARDC officers arrested about 30 combatants belonging to RED Tabara, a Burundian armed group active in the Fizi Plain. The Group interviewed the FARDC officers who intercepted the combatants. They informed the Group that the combatants came from the Mahanga refugee camp and had crossed the Ruzizi River to reach the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The armed group was in possession of seven AK-47s, three Motorola smartphones, one Thuraya satellite phone, two telephones, a solar panel system, a 12.7 mm machine gun, 14 rockets, bands of 12.7 mm ammunition and pharmaceutical products (see annex 46). The combatants were led by "Major-General" Birembu Melkiade (see annex 47). The Group's attempts to interview the combatants were not successful. The Group identified Melkiade in Ndolo Prison in Kinshasa but was not able to interview him owing to his ill health. The Group views the presence of foreign armed individuals on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a violation of the arms embargo.

Update on stock management

201. The Group continued to follow up on stockpile management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 22 February 2018, during a meeting held in Kinshasa with a representative of the National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group received information that 45,000 weapons had been marked. The representative also informed the Group that the Republican Guard had finally accepted to have its weapons marked. The representative equally informed the Group that a national plan was being elaborated to accelerate the process of monitoring small arms and light weapons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The validation of this plan by all stakeholders is expected to consolidate the normative and institutional frameworks in order to address the illicit transfer of weapons and ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.

202. However, in terms of weapons that have been marked, the Group noted a discrepancy between the data of the Commission and that of its partners, including the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the Mine Action Service of the United Nations (UNMAS). The Group received from MAG and UNMAS a slightly higher number of weapons that have been marked since 2016. A total of 56,401 State-owned weapons have been marked in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo Province as of the end of February 2018. These included 6,044 weapons marked before 2016 and 50,357 marked since January 2016 with MAG as an implementing partner, 8,733 weapons belonged to the Police nationale congolaise (PNC) and 47,668 to FARDC.

203. The Group took note of the achievements of the Commission in terms of the rehabilitation of some storage facilities and building capacity to manage them. In its final report of November 2016, the Commission had indicated that it had trained 168 armoury officers in Kinshasa for the management of facilities in line with international standards; trained four trainers for PNC and FARDC (two each); upgraded six armouries (three for PNC and three for FARDC) to meet international standards with the assistance of MAG; and provided PNC and FARDC with four containers (two each) with the capacity to store 160 small arms and light weapons each in Kinshasa and Kasangulu (Kongo Central).

204. While the Group welcomes the relative progress made by the Commission, it is concerned about the accuracy of its data and absence of a coordinated exchange of information between implementing partners. As indicated in its previous reports (S/2015/797, para. 107), the Group observed that the conditions of storage facilities outside Kinshasa had not improved, leaving FARDC and PNC storage sites vulnerable to the attacks of armed groups. Given the scope of the challenges faced in the country, the stated achievements remained far below the national needs. The Commission also indicated to the Group that it was still short of technical capacity in profiling and tracing.

VII. Recommendations

205. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

206. The Group recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

(a) Conduct thorough audits of *comptoirs* in Bunia and Bukavu and impose penalties, as appropriate, for the fraudulent underreporting of gold (see paras. 117–119 and paras. 123–126 above);

(b) Investigate and prosecute, as appropriate:

(i) Individuals and entities involved in the illegal trade and smuggling of natural resources (see paras. 115 and 116 above);

(ii) FARDC officers collaborating with armed groups (see para. 84 above);

(iii) Individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in proceedings that fully guarantee fair trial rights (see paras. 147–164 above).

Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict

207. The Group recommends that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict work with stakeholders, armed groups and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prevent the recruitment and use of children by armed groups through information, advocacy, screening of armed groups and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (see paras. 21 and 35 above).

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)

208. The Group recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004):

(a) Encourage Member States to notify the Committee of any delivery of military materiel and related assistance to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017) (see paras. 192–196 above);

(b) Encourage ICAO and WCO to act on the recommendations of the Group and report to the Committee thereon (see paras. 129–135 above).

Member States

209. The Group recommends that Member States provide adequate financial and logistic support to UNMAS in addressing MONUSCO challenges related to weapons and arms management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 181–191 above).

Annexes

Annex 1: Organizations and entities the Group officially met with during its mandate

GREAT LAKES REGION

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Government

Agence nationale de renseignement (ANR)

Auditorat militaire

Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification (CEEC)

Direction générale des migrations (DGM)

Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC)

Ministère des mines

Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux

Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération internationale

Unité d'Exécution du Programme national de DDR (UEPN-DDR)

Private sector

Metachem

ITRI Ltd/PACT

Association des Negociants de Minerais du Nord Kivu (ANEMNKI)

Association Congolaise des Banques (ACB)

Organizations

Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR)

Caritas

Banque Centrale du Congo - BCC

Embassy of Belgium

Embassy of France

Embassy of Sweden

Embassy of the United States

European Union (EU) Delegation in Kinshasa

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO)

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Rwanda

Government

Ministry of Defence

Uganda

Private sector

African Gold Refinery

Organizations

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

OUTSIDE THE GREAT LAKES REGION

France

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Organizations

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The Netherlands

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States of America

Organizations

United Nations Department of Safety and Security

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

INTERPOL

United Arab Emirates

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annex 2: Group of Experts' official communications

During the mandate, the Group addressed 50 official communications to Member States, international organizations and entities (including multiple communications to the same addresses).

The Group received responses from the Governments of Burundi, People's Republic of China, Tanzania, The Russian Federation and The Netherlands

The Group did not receive responses from the Governments of Bulgaria, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Rwanda[1], Serbia, Sudan, Uganda, and United Arab Emirates

The Group received responses from the following international organizations and entities: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Tin Association (formerly ITRI ltd), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

The Group did not receive responses from the following international organizations and entities: International Air transport association (IATA), International Precious Metal Refiners (IPMR) and Paypal holdings

[1] The Group acknowledge that the rwandan government allowed the Group to interview former FDLR combatants in Rwanda in January 2018

Annex 3: CMC and CNPSC Coalitions

During the duration of the Group's mandate, several armed groups claimed to be part of large coalitions taking up arms against the Congolese national Government. Two of the most striking coalitions are the *Collectif des mouvements pour le changement* (CMC) and the *Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo* (CNPSC), both claiming to have the capacity to destabilize the regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group investigated the two coalitions but did not find sufficient evidence to confirm their claims.

Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (CMC)

The *Collectif des mouvements pour le changement* (CMC) was created in January 2015. Its armed wing is called *Force de défense du peuple* (FDP). The president of the movement is Athanase Kuba Marandura, who is, according to several sources, residing in Tanzania (see S/2018/531, Annex 2). Jules Mulumba, the spokesperson of the group, claimed in an interview in March 2017[2] that the coalition is composed out of several armed groups from North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, and that they have established links with Kamuina Nsapu in Kasai province. The Group could not establish a concrete link with any armed groups in South Kivu, Ituri or Kasai provinces.

Nyatura leader John Love, active in Rutshuru territory in North Kivu, told the Group that his armed unit is part of the coalition and that the goal of the CMC is to overthrow the government of President Kabila.

In July 2017, 13 alleged members of the CMC were arrested in Burundi and transferred to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After interviewing several of them, the Group noted that only one of the arrested individuals was linked to the CMC.

In a public statement of 6 April 2018, Mulumba, claimed the attack and killing of 40 FARDC soldiers during clashes between the FDP and the FARDC on 3 and 5 April 2018. An FARDC source and a local researcher told the Group that during the clashes only a small number of FARDC and Nyatura were killed.

The Group did not find any evidence that the CMC has the capacity to destabilize the current Congolese State.

Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC)

William Amuri 'Yakutumba' created the *Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo* (CNPSC) in 2013 to oppose the government of President Kabila. In a statement, he claimed to have gathered like-minded armed groups to resist the bad governance, the foreign occupation and the balkanization of the country (see S/2018/531, Annex 30). It is unclear if the CNPSC has an active political wing. The coalition stayed dormant for a while, but from December 2016 the coalition became increasingly present in the Congolese media issuing various public statements.

Amuri managed to convince several armed groups to join the coalition. Apart from a few small armed groups from the Bembe community, other armed groups included

[2] http://www.politico.cd/en-off/2017/03/09/face-a-limpasse-politique-coalition-militaire-menace-de-restaurer-democratie-armes.html

Mai Mai Mailaka aka *Les anges pour la libération de l'esclavagisme de Salamabila* (ALES) under the command of Sheikh Assani, active in Maniema, Raya Mutomboki groups from the Shabunda area as well as armed groups from the Ruzizi Plain like Mai Mai Karakara, Mwenyemali and Mushombe.

Several sources told the Group that 'General' Janvier Buingo Karairi, commander of the *Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS), active in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu province, is Amuri's deputy in the CNPSC. However, the Group noted that there was no active participation of APCLS in the most recent CNPSC actions in South Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika provinces.

In the build up to the Uvira attack, the CNPSC and Amuri publicly stated that they would occupy Uvira and Bukavu before taking over from President Kabila in Kinshasa.

However, the Uvira attack of 27 September 2017 showed the weakness of the coalition. Some of the coalition partners from the Ruzizi Plain did not participate in the attack as initially planned and the attack was repulsed. Since then, the Ruzizi groups are not considered as members of the coalition any longer.

Following FARDC operations in January-February 2018 against Mai Mai Yakutumba, there have been no public statements from the CNPSC.

Annex 4: Images from ADF camp MAPOBU

Photos by FARDC in March 2018

Annex 5: CNPSC area of influence

The map below indicates the zone of influence (not necessarily in full or constant control) of the CNPSC coalition in South Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika provinces in October 2017 when their zone of influence was on the highest level.



Map by the United Nations, as edited by the Group of Experts

Annex 6: Detailed map of the heartland of Mai-Mai Yakutumba in Ngandja forest and Ubwari Peninsula

The map below indicates the zone of control of Mai Mai Yakutumba on the Ubwari Peninsula, the Ngandja forest and the coastal areas from Talama up to Mizimu. In this area, the Mai Mai Yakutumba established a parallel administration and controlled the maritime traffic on Lake Tanganyika. Kazimia was the base camp of the movement until the FARDC operations ended this situation in January 2018.



Map by the United Nations, as edited by the Group of Experts

Annex 7: Mai-Mai Yakutumba prisoners in Munienze prison



LISTE DES CBT MAI – MAI GP YAKUTUMBA

	NOM ET POST NOM	FONCTION	SPEC OU FORCES	LIEU ET DATE D' ARRESTATION	OBS
01	EKANDA SAIDI Alias DRAGILA	Comd Force Nav	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	Ex Cap FARDC
02	WAKANDA MONGELO	N3 et Comd 2nd	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
03	MONGA DUNIANI ARCHIMEDE	N1 et Srt	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
04	BYAMUNGU SADI	Chef N2	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
05	MUCHUKIWA KALUME FERDINAT	Adjt N2	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	Ex LI FARDC du 3301 Regt auteur assassinat du Cap KITAMBALA DJUMA dans la nuit du 12 au 13 Oct à Baraka
06	KINTU KIYOMBE SEBA	N2 Adjt	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
07	WASHIKALA RAMAZANI SALUMU	N4	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
08	ISAYA DJUMA ISHIBO	Comd Bde	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
09	SAFARI FIKIRI	Comd Base 2nd	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
10	MITUNGANO BALIBANGA	Comd Cie	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
11	MUKOKA WAZABANGA WABOZONGA	Comd Cie	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
12	EMUNGA EDDY KENZO	Comd Cie	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
13	DUNIA AMULI	Comd Cie	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
14	NURDINE PHILIPO MUDJINGA NKULU	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
15	KARIMU LUMUMBA	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
16	DUNIA OREDI SHINDANO	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
17	ANTEJI ABWE	N4 Adjt	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
18	OREDI NGELA	Srt N3	Force	Burundi/Rumonge,	

	SOCRATE		Nav	le 29/01/018	
19	RAMAZANI KASHINDI	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
20	IBRAHIM REMY	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
21	EVALE PATRICE	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
22	MWEMA MAKAZA	Chef Section	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
23	ANDRE MBUNGA	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
24	OMARI LEONARD	Opérateur	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
25	CHANCE ROGER	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
26	ERESI AABUTI	OPJ N2	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
27	KASKILE ABEDI	Chauffeur	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
28	BOLAKA EMMANUEL	Chef Pl	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
29	BYAMUNGU KASHINDI	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
30	INNOCENT MORICE	Srt Bu 2	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
31	GABRIEL KABANTU	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
32	MALINDOOO RASHIDI	Soldat	Force Nav	Burundi/Rumonge, le 29/01/018	
33	RAMAZANI OMBA GABRIEL	Comd Sect	Infanterie	Le 02/01/018	Ex Lt FARDC de la Bde Requin
34	DUNIA NDAKONGABA	Comd Bde	Infanterie	Kataka, le 19/01/018	
35	BALEKELO KONE CIKURU	Comd Cie	Infanterie	Mukera, le 09/11/017	
36	ANANA BYAMUNGU BUSHIRI	Chef Pl	Infanterie	Kabumbe, le 15/01/018	
37	JEAN JACQUES MUFAUME	Comd Bde	Infanterie	Uvira, le 27/11/017	
38	BUCHEKABIRI FUNGULO	Srt Bn	Infanterie	Baraka, le 29/01/018	
39	VICTOR SUMAILI	Rav Cie	Infanterie	Kazima, le 03/02/018	
40	KUMBE BYAMUSE PAUL	S1 Bde	Infanterie	Kazima, le 27/01/018	
41	RAMA NSA	Chef Sec	Infanterie	Mizimu, le 03/02/018	
42	LOKWANGO	Soldat	Infanterie	Mielei, le	

				16/12/017	
43	KAMILI KABE SHAMALA	Soldat	Infanterie	Misisi, le 16/12/017	
44	SIGEN TAMBWE	Soldat	Infanterie	Burundi, le 28/12/017	
45	MANABE MASANGILA	Soldat	Infanterie	Misisi, le 13/01/018	
46	SULEMANI BYAMUNGU	Soldat	Infanterie	Uvira, le 28/01/018	
47	HAKIZANO BAHATI	Soldat	Infanterie	Sebele, le 28/01/018	
48	DJUMA RAJABU	Soldat	Infanterie	Karamba, le 26/01/018	
49	ATEMBO EKUDU	Soldat	Infanterie	Kihanda, le 28/01/018	
50	SAIDI ELISE	Soldat	Infanterie	Yungu, le 26/01/018	
51	TAMBWE PIERRE	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
52	ASSA ASSANI	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
53	ESPOIR KASHINDI	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
54	ZABONA DERO	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
55	KIBINDA EBENGO	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
56	NDERUMBU WERRA	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
57	BISIMWA MAPENDANO	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
58	LUCHWA MITEMBE	Soldat	Infanterie	Kibanga, le 26/01/018	
59	WEKEYA RAMAZANI	Soldat	Infanterie	Sebele, le 28/01/018	
60	ALAKE MAMBO	Soldat	Infanterie	Lusenga , le 03/02/018	
61	HERITIER MALEGA	Soldat	Infanterie	Kagando, le 30/01/018	
62	MAKENE MSENWA		Infanterie	Kibanga, le 03/02/018	
63	RAMAZANI SILIMU HUSSENI		Infanterie		
64	MAMBO ERI KASHINDI		Infanterie		
65	CLEMENT ASSUMANI		Infanterie	Sebele, le 01/01/018	
66	MWAMBA ANDRE		Infanterie	Baraka, le 03/02/018	
67	ANGALA PILIPILI		Infanterie	Baraka, le	



	ALEMBE			23/01/018
68	JEAN BOSCO CHUBAKA			Burundi, le 29/01/018
69	OBEDI NSABIMANA (Burundais)			Burundi, le 23/02/018
70	MSAMBYA SELEMANI	Civil	Fce	Burundi, le 30/01/018
71	BONANE SELEMANI	S4 Bn	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
72	ISAYA GARIEL	Fus	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
73	BONHEUR LABEURNE	Démobilisé	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
74	BYAMUNGU LUKANYAGA	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
75	SHUKURU MBAREMBA	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
76	ILONGA LOKANDA	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
77	SHABANI SIKUZANI	Fus	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
78	MANUELI IDI	Fus	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
79	BAHATI JYPEIRO	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
80	DIEME NESTORI	Fus	Infanterie	Burundi, le 30/01/018
81	FARIALA LOMONA	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
82	SUMAILI RAMAZANI	Fus	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
83	KASKILE TOHI	Fus	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018
84	WILONDJA FINASI	Civil	—	Burundi, le 30/01/018
85	FREDI ASUMANI	S4	Force nav	Burundi, le 30/01/018

Fait à Uvira, le 09 Fév 018

T2 Rens

Chef T2 Sect Ops SKL II SSK

Document received from the FARDC in March 2018

Annex 8: Civil society security report of Basimukindje groupement between November 2017 and January 2018

GROUPEMENT BASIMUKINDJI

MINI RAPPORT SECURITAIRE POUR CERTAINS VILLAGES DU GROUPEMENT BASIMUKINDJI

N° LIEU (VILLAGE)	PERIODE	INCIDENCE	AUTEURS
01 BALUNGA	octobre	Vole et pillage de véhicule de passagers	Voleurs à main armée
02 MBUENGO	octobre	Vole d'une Arme de guerre	Non identifié
03 MBUENGO	octobre	Mise d'un Appel volontaire de [illegible]	militaire FARDC
04 KIKWENDA	octobre	Vole et pillage des biens de Commerçants + Brûlé d'un Véhicule marque	Voleurs à main armée
05 MBUENGO	14/11/2017	Mise de 2 militaires FARDC dans la nuit	Non identifié
06 MBUENGO	12 octobre	Prestation extorsion de 2 Chefs de village	FARDC
07 MAYELE	octobre	Déplacement de la population, pillage et vole des biens de la population	FARDC et Mai-Mai
08 MBUENGO	octobre	Prestation extorsion [illegible]	FARDC
09 KIKWENDA	octobre	Mise de 2 militaires par taxi	Non identifié
10 KIKWENDA	octobre	Prestation extorsion des francs par taxi moto et taxi vélo	FARDC
11 KIKWENDA	24/11/2017	Mise de 2 militaires par taxi	Non identifié
12 KIKWENDA	25 octobre	Vole et pillage des biens de population [illegible]	FARDC
13 AHEAD	octobre	Vole dans la maison et boutique	Voleurs à main armée
14 KIKWENDA	29/11/2017	Vole dans la maison dans la nuit	Voleurs à main armée
15 MBUENGO	27/11/2017	Prestation extorsion du Chef de village [illegible]	FARDC

1° [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
15 KALINGA [illegible]	29/12/2017	Vote dans la maison de Bourgou, Kintigui	Voleurs à main armée
4 [illegible]	4/1/2018	Pillages des biens de population Dues aux affrontements entre FARAFI et maliens	FARAFI et maliens
2 [illegible]	[illegible]	Perception des droits d'études et des enseignants dans postes et sont maliens	FARAFI
9 [illegible]	[illegible]	Vole dans la maison aux environs de 20h	Les gens en tenue militaire, [illegible]
12 MOMA	actuellement	Perception arbitraire de 2 par Semaine dans postes et dans la Tendapreneurs de maliens	FARAFI

NB - la population du Groupement Kalinkinsi est estimé à 168 282 habitants

- Perception arbitraire des pêcheurs par la FARAFI (Forces navales) dans la [illegible] non [illegible] à l'endroit de l'hippopotame
- Comme une petite recommandation, l'Etat doit mener une negociation entre la FARAFI et maliens dans la mediation de la MINUSMA

Document received from a local source in Baraka in January 2018

Annex 9: Organization of CNPSC administration



Document received by the Group from a DRC official in January 2018


Mai Mai Yakutumba used documents with the CNPSC heading of the CNPSC ministry of interior, decentralization and security affairs
Mai Mai Yakutumba had their own migration office
There was a Mai Mai Yakutumba DGM post in Kazimia
FICHE DE CONTROLE DE MOUVEMENT DES BATEAUX
NOMBRE DE PASSAGER A BORD
ELEMENTS NON DECLARES
CNPSC
CNPSC stamp

Document received by the Group from a DRC official in January 2018

Annex 10: Issue of international travel permits



Document received by the Group from a DRC official in January 2018

Annex 11: CNPSC and Burundian stamps on a CEPGL *laissez passer* document



Document received by the Group from Monusco in January 2018

Annex 12: Example of Mai-Mai Yakutumba taxation of ships

N° [redacted] 0001606
B.P.Fr [redacted]
REÇU de M. MIV IMANI
la somme de [redacted]
Pour : 4 x 3 bidons gas. pour
sur bateau.
Dimanche le 31 dec 2017

Document received by the Group from Monusco in January 2018

Annex 13: Map of NDC-R zone of influence

The map below indicates the zone of influence (not necessarily in full or constant control) of the NDC-R in Walikale, Masisi, Rutshuru and Lubero territories in March 2018. Irameso and Kasugho are the two main localities with a significant NDC-R presence. Other localities with NDC-R presence are Bukumbirwa, Bunyatenge, Fatua, Buleusa, Oninga and Mutongo.



Map by the United Nations, as edited by the Group of Experts

Annex 14: NDC-R statement on sanctioning Guidon Shimiray Mwissa

INDIGNATION DU MOUVEMENT NDUMA DEFENCE OF CONGO RENOVE SUR LA SANCTION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES NATIONS UNIES A L'ENCONTRE DE SON PRESIDENT ET COMMANDANT SUPREME SON EXCELLENCE

Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA.

Faisant suite aux informations qui circulent sur les ondes des médias tant nationaux qu'internationaux sur la décision du 1er janvier 2018 du conseil de sécurité des nations unies créée par la résolution 1533(2004) concernant la République Démocratique du Congo dont le General Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA figure sur la liste de quatre personnalités actives représentant une menace pour la paix, la stabilité et la securite en République Démocratique du Congo au titre du paragraphe 7 g de la résolution 2293 (2016)

Nous n'oublierons pas ici a vous rappeler que c'est apres le génocide rwandais de 1994 que la communauté internationale obligeant le gouvernement Zairois d'ouvrir les frontieres et accueillir plus d'un million des Hutus rwandais armés et creant d'immenses camps aux abords de la ville de Goma

En 1997, l'aide portée aux troupes du Mzee Laurent Desiré KABILA par l'Ouganda et le Rwanda oblige plus de 400 000 refugiés Hutu rwandais à se disperser dans les forets du Kivu etant bien armés.

A leur arrivée, la population Kivutienne etant caractérisée par l'esprit d'hospitalité, a donné à manger et à boire à ces derniers.

En cette même année 1997, les FDLR en revanche ont commencé à violer, tuer, piller, incendier, exploiter illicitement notre richesse et jusqu'à s'accaparer même du pouvoir coutumier.

Voila pourquoi apres plusieurs plaidoyers adressés au gouvernement congolais et à la communauté internationale mais sans succès, nous qui n'avions plus le droit de vivre, nous qui n'avions plus la possibilité d'être des citoyens libres et qui, par la contrainte et la terreur dependaient entièrement des étrangers, avons jugé bon de nous prendre en charge en creant le mouvement : NDUMA DEFENCE OF CONGO à Bujumbura, dans la localité Ngeruza, groupement Utunda, secteur des Wanianga, Territoire de Walikale, province du Nord-Kivu en République Democratique du Congo en date du 1er janvier 2008 avec comme objectif de se prendre en charge en combattant ces ennemis de la paix et leurs alliés.

Soucieux du conteste auquel la pauvre population de l'Est se trouve, puis en étant d'accord avec cette dernière, emu par le sens patriotique, Monsieur Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA sera plébiscité à la tête des operations de traque et chasse des FDLR et d'autres groupes armés étrangers et locaux nocifs à la population.

Il sied de signaler qu'apres le travail de titan effectue par le General Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA et son groupe, nous avons réussit à mettre hors d'état de nuire l'ennemi dans le Territoire de Walikale, Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi, une partie de la province de la Tshopo et celle de Maniema ou la population vaque librement dans ses activites quotidiennes.

Vu cette paix durable longtemps cherchée par le gouvernement congolais et la communaute internationale sans succès, mais instauré cependant par le mouvement N D C R; d'ou la MONUSCO a juge bon de vider ses bases dans le Territoire de Walikale et ses environs, pourtant jadis la population devrait être convoyée par la MONUSCO et /ou les FARDC pour se déplacer d'un lieu à un autre suivant un programme hebdomadaire ;

A titre d'exemple : Mpofi –Kembe, Kibua-Ishunga, Kashebere-Kaancha, Pinga-Kalembe, Kalembe-Mwesso, ... pour les marchands et les voyageurs, par fois même pour les agriculteurs.
Au lieu que le gouvernement congolais et la communauté internationale louent notre bravoure au service que nous faisons qu'était pourtant leur mission, nous sommes surpris d apprendre une telle decision hâtive et montée de toutes pièces portee à la personnalité de notre chef.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, nous nous insurgeons contre la décision prise par la communauté internationale et rejetons en bloc toutes les allégations contenues dans cette décision que nous qualifions de non fondée, conçue dans des bureaux climatisés qui ne reflète pas la réalite du terrain.

Etant informé et formé sur le respect du droit international humanitaire, nous restons ouvert aux enquêtes pouvant etre diligentées par la communauté nationale qu'internationale dans l'étendue sous notre contrôle d'une façon objective en vue de s'imprégner de la vraie réalité des faits.

Ainsi, fait à Musituni, le 04/02/2018

Pour le bureau d'études du mouvement NDCR

1) Christian HANGI MWISSA

2) Désiré NGABO KISUBA

3) MUNDUZA MUNGANGA Floribert

4) BATIFEMI MOLISHO Dieu Merci

The Group received the document from a source in March 2018

Annex 15: Photos of "General" Shimiray Mwissa Guidon

Pictures posted on the internet in March 2018

Annex 16: Photos of NDC-R combatants in military fatigues



Pictures posted on the internet in March 2018

Annex 17: Letter of Guidon to the President of the United Nations Security Council

Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA
Nord Kivu/RD Congo
Président et Commandant suprême
du Mouvement NDC Rénové
Contacts :
+243 812572619
Email :

Objet : contestation de la sanction
Portée à ma personne

Au président du conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies à New York

Monsieur

Par votre publication du 1er janvier 2018 parue sur les ondes des médias portant sanction à ma personne

Bien qu'accordant la plus grande importance à vos observations, je tiens à contester cette décision

En effet, étant d'origine congolaise et animé par l'esprit du patriotisme; Vu la misère que traverse la population congolaise à l'Est du pays par les FDLR et alliés depuis les années 1997 et d'autres Groupes armés étrangers et locaux nocifs à la population ;

D'un commun accord avec cette misérable population locale de base, avons jugé bon de nous prendre en charge

Notre objectif étant loin de vouloir représenter une menace pour la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité en RD Congo mais plutôt de garantir une paix durable à notre population

En outre, mon groupe et moi sommes informés et formés sur le respect du Droit International Humanitaire par les Agences des Nations Unies entre autres : Child Protection de la MONUSCO, CICR, Geneva Call.

Je sollicite de votre part un réexamen de votre décision et reste à votre entière disposition pour un entretien.

En vous remerciant de votre compréhension, je vous prie d'agréer Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Ainsi fait à Mushuru, le 08 Février 2018

The Group received the document from a source in March 2018

Annex 18: *Cahier de charge* of NDC-R



Cette population oubliée, négligée, marginalisée et opprimée est sacrifiée à la merci de toutes les atrocités des FDLR guidés par nos frères Congolais mal intentionnés et non avertis, des mains nues pour réussir leurs missions de tuer, voler, piller et exploiter illicitement notre richesse.

En effet, après plusieurs plaidoyers adressés au Gouvernement Congolais et à la Communauté internationale mais sans succès, avons jugé bon de nous prendre en charge.

LES OBJECTIFS

Néanmoins notre prise en charge loin de vouloir renverser le pouvoir Démocratiquement élu, viserait :

1. Combattre les FDLR pour réhabiliter notre misérable population dans ses droits ;
2. Lutter contre l'exploitation illicite et anarchique de notre richesse qui remplisse les poches de particuliers pillards et pêcheur en eau trouble au lieu de contribuer au développement de la population Congolaise ;
3. Aussi lutter contre la non représentativité à la gestion de la chose publique de l'Etat car c'est inadmissible de reproduire plus et rester exclus à la gestion de notre production.

5) Les recrutements des investisseurs sérieux pour préparer l'après mine dans Walikale car les mines sont épuisables, il y a risque de se retrouver avec un Walikale de bandits dans les jours avenir.

En fin, nous supplions à notre Gouvernement et à la Communauté internationale de reconnaitre nos efforts pour analyser rationnellement nos revendications à tel enseigne que nous puissions contribuer à notre cher et bien pays.

POUR LE MOUVEMENT NDUMA DEFENCE OF CONGO RENOVE

The Group received the document from a source in March 2018

Annex 19: Taxation system of NDC-R: monthly *jetons* at 1, 000 francs congolais each



Collected by the UN in Kasugho in March 2018

Annex 20: Public Statement of UPLC in January 2018



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
UNION DES PATRIOTES POUR LA LIBERATION DU CONGO
« U.P.L.C »

DECLARATION POLITIQUE N° 001.../UPLC/RDC/2018

Nous, Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo, U.P.L.C. en sigle, mouvement politique et la Force Patriotique Congolaise, FPC en sigle sa branche armée, déclarons à partir de ce jour démissionnaire le régime de Mr Joseph KABILA KABANGE.

En effet, c'est depuis plus de deux décennies que notre pays, la République Démocratique du Congo, la terre de nos ancêtres, connaît des guerres injustes et est occupé par des imposteurs sous la houlette du RWANDA et de l'OUGANDA. Cet état des choses a été à la base de l'occupation effective de notre pays. C'est ainsi que les envahisseurs se sont livrés au pillage systématique de nos ressources naturelles, à la mauvaise gouvernance doublée de l'infiltration de nos frontières et des institutions de la République à tous les niveaux.

Au phénomène d'infiltration et du pillage systématique de nos ressources s'ajoutent l'injustice sociale, les tueries et massacres de tout genre des paisibles populations, un système génocidaire importé du Rwanda. Le braquage et le kidnapping, les intimidations à quiconque souhaiterait revendiquer et défendre les droits et libertés des congolais.

C'est pour cette raison que l'Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo, en sigle UPLC, interpelle tout congolais vivant sur le territoire national et ceux de la diaspora préoccupés par cette situation soucieux de la libération du peuple congolais de s'aligner derrière l'Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo afin d'éradiquer ce système d'occupation nous imposé par les hommes animés de mauvaise foi et d'esprit d'agression.

1

- A toutes les composantes saines des Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC et de la Police National Congolaise, PNC et à tous les volontaires de se désolidariser des ennemis de la paix et se rallier derrière l'Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo, UPLC et sa branche armée dite Force patriotique Congolaise, FPC, pour chasser les criminels envahisseurs de notre territoire national, la RDC.
- Aux pays voisins de la République Démocratique du Congo de ne pas s'ingérer dans les problèmes congolais mais plutôt de tisser des relations de bon voisinage.

Nous en appelons ainsi à la SADEC, à l'Union Africaine, à l'Union Européenne et aux Nations Unies de prendre acte de cette libération qui constitue désormais la clé de voute de notre indépendance effective comme voulu par nos ancêtres dont Emery PATRICE LUMUMBA, SIMON KIMBANGU, MSR EMMANUEL KATALIKO et ENOCH NYAMWISI MUVINGI etc. Nous leur demandons de soutenir les efforts du peuple congolais car ils sont aussi témoins de notre situation misérable et catastrophique ;

Enfin, nous saluons à leur juste valeur, les mesures et les sanctions que ces différentes organisations de la Communauté internationale ont prises pour geler les comptes bancaires de certains bourreaux et de tous leurs complices, contribuant ainsi à chercher une solution, tant soit peu, au problème de notre pays.

- **Que vive le peuple congolais ;**
- **Que vive la République Démocratique du Congo ;**
- **Que vive l'Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo.**

Fait à LUBERO **le** 02 / 01 **/2018**

Lue par MAHANGAIKO APIPAWE John
Porte-parole

UPLC
ALWIN-FIN ETAT MAJOR CONGO

BALEMBI WANGAHEMUKA
Coordonnateur

2

Annex 21: Ministerial decree on validated mining sites in Ituri province

République Démocratique du Congo

MINISTERE DES MINES

Le Ministre

ARRETE MINISTERIEL N° 0005/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2016 DU 8 Feb 2016 PORTANT QUALIFICATION ET VALIDATION DES SITES MINIERS DU TERRITOIRE DE MAMBASA DANS LA PROVINCE DE L'ITURI

Vu la Constitution, telle que revue et complétée par la Loi n° 11/002 du 20 janvier 2011, spécialement ses articles 9, 93 et 202 point 36 litera f ;

Vu la Loi n°007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code Minier ;

Vu la Loi n°015/2002 du 16 octobre 2002 portant Code du travail ;

Vu le Décret 038/2003 du 26 mars 2003 portant Règlement Minier;

Vu, telle que modifiée et complétée à ce jour, l'Ordonnance n° 014/078 du 07 décembre 2014 portant nomination des Vice Premiers Ministres, des Ministres d'Etat, des Ministres et des Vice-Ministres ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 15/014 du 21 mars 2015 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Gouvernement, modalités pratiques de collaboration entre le Président de la République et le Gouvernement ainsi qu'entre les membres du Gouvernement ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 15/015 du 21 mars 2015 fixant les attributions des Ministères, spécialement son article 1er B point 19 ;

Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 057/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012 du 29 février 2012 portant mise en œuvre du Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la Conférence Internationale de la Région des Grands Lacs « CIRGL » en République Démocratique du Congo ;

Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 0919/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2015 du 29 octobre 2015 fixant des procédures d'inspection, de qualification et de

validation des sites miniers des filières aurifère et stannifère en République Démocratique du Congo;

Considérant la lettre n° CAB.MIN/MINES/02/0379/2011 du 13 avril 2011 transmettant les termes de référence aux équipes conjointes pour la validation des Mines ;

Considérant le rapport de qualification des sites miniers du Territoire de Mambasa dans la Province de l'Ituri dressé par l'équipe conjointe multipartite, le 16 novembre 2015 et réceptionné le 25 novembre 2015 au Cabinet du Ministre des Mines ;

Vu la nécessité et l'urgence ;

ARRETE:

Article 1 :

Est approuvé, le rapport de mission effectuée, du 11 au 16 novembre 2015, par l'équipe conjointe en Territoire de Mambasa dans la Province de l'Ituri, pour la qualification et la validation des sites miniers de cette entité territoriale.

Article 2 :

Le tableau repris en annexe au présent Arrêté fait état des sites miniers validés et non validés suivant la qualification conférée par le rapport de mission dont question à l'article 1er.

La durée de validité de la présente qualification est de six (06) mois à compter de la date de signature du présent Arrêté.

Le rapport de mission et le présent Arrêté y compris son annexe sont publiés sur les sites WEB du Ministère des Mines et du Projet PROMINES.

Article 3 :

Les sites miniers qualifiés et validés peuvent faire l'objet d'un audit indépendant, soit à l'initiative du Ministre National ayant les Mines dans ses attributions, soit à l'initiative des organismes internationaux tels que l'ONU, l'OCDE, la CIRGL ou tout autre organisme public ou privé national

ou international concerné et/ou impliqué dans la mise en œuvre des standards CTC, OCDE et CIRGL.

Les sites miniers qualifiés « **Rouge** » ou « **Jaune** » et non validés ne peuvent faire l'objet d'aucune activité minière.

Les intervenants lésés par la non validation des sites miniers dans lesquels ils opèrent peuvent requérir une inspection de suivi en vue d'examiner l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire et sociale desdits sites.

Article 4 :

Le Secrétaire Général des Mines, le Directeur Général du Cadastre Minier, le Coordonnateur Général du SAESSCAM et le Coordonnateur National du Projet Promines sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent Arrêté qui entre en vigueur à la date de sa signature.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 12 FEB 2016

Martin KABWELULU

République Démocratique du Congo

MINISTERE DES MINES

Le Ministre

ANNEXE A L'ARRETE MINISTERIEL N° . 0005 /CAB MIN/MINES/01/2016 DU 12 FEB 2016 PORTANT QUALIFICATION ET VALIDATION DES SITES MINIERS DU TERRITOIRE DE MAMBASA PROVINCE DE L'ITURI

N°	SITES MINIERS							Qualification/ Validation		Observations
	Dénomination	Territoire	Minerais exploités	Code	Coordonnées géographiques			Ver. jaune. Rouge	Valide	
					Longitude	Latitude	Altitude (m)			
01	Mapopese	Mambasa	Or	EMM MAS PI Mines Cert 001 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	
02	Kafeuera Mokotombe	Mambasa	Or	MDB SOM PI Mines Cert 002 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	
03	Kancha'le	Mambasa	Or	JPA ME PI Mines Cert 003 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	
04	Tokoleko Mokopombe	Mambasa	Or	FKN TOK PI Mines Cert 004 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	
05	Tokomeva	Mambasa	Or	JB BUT PI Mines Cert 005 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	
06	Lunga Mokpe	Mambasa	Or	MP MAN PI Mines Cert 006 2016	E28°51'02.9"	N01°49'22.7"	1.521	Vert	Valide	

Légende :

Cert : Certificat
PI : Province orientale de l'Ituri
MAS : Village Masiang
SOM : Village Some
ME : Village Vera
TOK : Village Tokoleko
EMM : Mr Emmanuel Monga Mokoto
MDB : Mr Nestor Dumanmi Bin Mdukuru
JPA : Mr Jean Paul Adobi
BUT : Village Butame
MAN : Village Manziangé
FKN : Mr Frederic Kakese Nemboegeo
JB : Mr Jaeke Bere
MP : Mr Michel Pamazoni

Fait à Kinshasa le 12 FEB 2016

Martin KABWELULU

Annex 22: Gold smuggling route in Ituri province

Map edited by the Group

Annex 23: Gold exports from South Kivu in 2017

CEEC Sud-Kivu	2017		
Date Emission	**Exportateur**	**Pays de destination**	**Poids Net en kilogramme**
24/01/2017	Ets NAMUKAYA	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	3,09 kg
27/01/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	5,36 kg
23/03/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	5,66 kg
21/04/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	5,29 kg
14/06/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	5,98 kg
28/07/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	7,10 kg
28/08/2017	Ets NAMUKAYA	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	4,91 kg
06/09/2017	Ets NAMUKAYA	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	6,02 kg
14/09/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	6,18 kg
03/11/2017	RUBYAF sarl	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	13,66 kg
29/11/2017	Mines Propres	EMIRAT ARABES UNIS	6,49 kg
Total			69,738 Kg

The Group received the document from CEEC South Kivu in February 2018

Annex 24: Documents used by OBWIN SARL to export gold from Bukavu in 2017



AUTORISATION D'EXPORTATION
N°MINES/354.8/...0414.2K/SK/2017

...de production artisanale de la République Démocratique du Congo du sigle **OBWIN Sarl** Comptoir a été certifié le 10/05/2017 par notre service d'Expertise d'Evaluation et de Certification des substances précieuses et semi précieuses conformément aux prescrits de l'Avis Technique numéro 0247-354-EM-K-KAS-MB-B-2015 du 04/04/2017

...OBWIN en sigle OBWIN Sarl, s'étant acquitté de ses obligations pour l'exercice 2016, est autorisé d'exporter une quantité de 5.044grs ... 78% ... Or fin pour une valeur taxable de **13.690$** emballée dans un sachet plastique du CEEC suivant l'itinéraire BUKAVU-DUBAI pour BLEU DIAMOND METAL TRADING DOO IV SOKO 259, DUBAI dans un délai de soixante (60) ...

La présente est accompagnée d'un Certificat Régional et d'une Licence d'Exportation délivrés par les Services compétentes.

Fait à Bukavu le 15/05/2017

LE CHEF DE DIVISION PROVINCIALE DES MINES

Michel LIETE TUTA WA TUTA

LE MINISTRE PROVINCIALE DES MINES RESSOURCES HYDRAULIQUES ELECTRICITE ET DES HYDROCARBURES

APOLLINAIRE BULINDI
Ministre Provincial



BLEU DIAMOND METAL
TRADING GOLD SOUQ Bte
DUBAI

Doit pour livraison de ce qui suit :
Marchandise : OR de production Artisanale

Nombre de colis	Tare	Poids net	Poids brut
1	00	5044g	

Prix Unitaire : 2.714 USD/g
Prix total : 13690 USD
Nous disons dollars des Etats Unis : Treize mille six cent quatre-vi
Pour OBWIN SAR


« C.E.E.C »
Antenne Provinciale du Haut-Plateau
PROCES-VERBAL DE PESAGE, EMPOTAGE ET PRELEVEMENT D'ECHANTILLON DES PRODUITS
L'an deux
Nous soussigné
et du CEEC
munis
CEWUN SARL
en présence
produit.
ALBERT
jour du mois de AVRIL
agent de service des Mines du ressort, de l'OCC de la D
nous trouvant dans les installations du Timbre des
Comptoir / transformation / Comptoir agréé
ou son mandataire, avons procédé au
après spécifiés
Nous dressé, aux jour, mois et an.
déclarons les renseignements sincères
CAMES
CONGO
DIRECTION


VALIDATION

DECLARATION DE SORTIE DEFINITIVE



CERTIFICAT D'ANALYSE ET D'EVALUATION N° 993/2016

PRODUIT : OR

Chef de Service Technique

SIGNATURES DES REPRESENTANTS DE

MINES

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTERE DES MINES
CERTIFICAT DE LA CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE
SUR LA REGION DES GRANDS LACS

Annex 25: Smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten along the Minova-Kalungu axis

An incident report of the Kalungu-Minova sector, with the details of 1,300kg of coltan that FARDC officers attempted to snatch from a négociant in Numbi, South Kivu





The Group received the document from the South Kivu mining authorities in March 2018

Annex 26: Letter documenting a dispute between North Kivu and South Kivu mineral authorities regarding ownership of untagged minerals found in the house of a *négociant*



C.N.L.F.M

ORDRE DE MISSION COLLECTIF N°CO/NO.PROV /[illegible]/11/2017

Les personnes dont les noms suivent sont désignées pour effectuer une mission officielle :

1. Major LUKAMBA Marlon, Auditorat Militaire OPS ;
2. Charles ADROPIA, Inspecteur à l'ANR ;
3. Silas KAYEMBE MPOYI, Chef de Service Anti-fraude ;
4. Sergent Major MAKELELE MUHIGIRWA, Auditorat Militaire OPS ;
5. TOMBOLA TONTON, Auditorat Militaire OPS ;
6. Caporal LOBINI MATESO, Auditorat Militaire OPS ;

Lieu de la Mission : Territoire de Masisi
Itinéraire : GOMA-KITOTSHE-BWEREMANA-MINOVA-GOMA
Motif : Approfondir les investigations de la fraude sur l'axe KIROTSHE-BWEREMANA-MINOVA
Durée : OPEN
Date de départ : 07 novembre 2017
Date de retour : OPEN
Imputation : A LA CHARGE DE LA CNLFM

Les autorités tant Civiles, Militaires que celles de la Police Nationale Congolaise sont priées d'apporter assistance aux porteurs de la présente.

Fait à Goma, le 07 novembre 2017

Daniel NGOIE MBAKA

Coordonnateur Prov CNLFM/NK

Le Secteur Prov CLE [illegible]

KALUNGU , le 09/11/2017

N° MINES/354 /DIVIMINES/BMIKI/AMN/SKM/009/017

Transmis Copie pour information à

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre Provincial des Mines, des Hydrocarbures et de l'Environnement du Sud-Kivu ;
- Monsieur le Chef de Division Provinciale des Mines du Sud-Kivu ;
- Monsieur l'Auditeur Supérieur de l'Auditorat Militaire

(Tous) à BUKAVU

- Monsieur l'Administrateur de Territoire de et à KALEHE ;
- Monsieur le Commandant de District de la Police de KALEHE à MINOVA ;
- Monsieur le Chef de Bureau Minier Isolé de KALEHE (DIWI à KALEHE
- Monsieur le Chef de Poste d'Encadrement Administratif de et à MINOVA ;
- Monsieur le Chef de Groupement de BUZI à MINOVA
- Monsieur l'Agent Territorial de et à KALUNGU

Objet Rapport circonstanciel
Doss Fraude Minière

A Monsieur le Chef d'Antenne Minière de et
à NUMBI

Monsieur le Chef d'Antenne,

C'est avec tant des questions que je vous adresse ce Rapport pour vous parler de la situation du Secteur Minier de KALUNGU-MINOVA d'où je suis le Chef de Secteur

En effet, c'est la troisième fois que nous recevons la même délégation en provenance de GOMA, Province voisine du Nord-Kivu, **pour venir à la recherche des minerais échappés dans la Zone de Contrôle de MASISI** (Nord-Kivu) mais qui

ne voulait pas nous exhibé leur Ordre de Mission ni de nous parler de leur qualité, même nous associer de leur Mission entant qu'Agent de l'Etat comme eux ayant aussi les responsabilités de cette Entité à notre personnalité dans le Domaine Minier ; même pour d'autres Services de l'Etat œuvrant dans cette Entité.

Pour ce faire, par une grande surprise en date du 07/11/2017, nous avons reçu un coup de téléphone qui disait que le domicile de Monsieur [redacted], Opérateur Economique Libéral de KALUNGU est entouré des personnes non autrement identifiées mais déclarent de leurs remettre les minerais qui ont échappés le contrôle dans la Zone de MASISI où ils sont Responsables. C'est maintenant que l'Inspecteur [redacted] va m'appeler et me dire de faire KALUNGU avec lui et quelques éléments de l'Auditorat à sa disposition vers 23h 47'. C'est ainsi que tous avons passé la nuit débout au centre de KALUNGU. Le matin en date du 08/11/2017, tous ensembles avons trouvé dans un enclos proche de la maison de l'Opérateur précité Un lot de 26 Colis des minerais des différentes dimensions non tagués sans aucun Document Administratif ni Comptable que nos Confrères en provenance du Nord-Kivu voulaient ramener à GOMA ; décision qui n'a pas été adoptée par nous les Agents du Sud-Kivu (Poste d'Etat de MINOVA en Territoire de KALEHE).
Toute fois, je me communiquais avec mon Hiérarchie à travers le téléphone mais sans appui ni réaction de leur part.

C'est maintenant que Monsieur l'Inspecteur de l'Auditorat Militaire de MINOVA a reçu l'ordre de son Hiérarchie pour amener les minerais à BUKAVU à l'Auditorat Supérieur de Bukavu où tous avons accompagné ces minerais que nous avons remis aux mains du Secrétaire et le Magistrat en cette date du 08/11/2017 vers 16h''46' tel qu'ils étaient arrêtés au niveau de KALUNGU (26 colis au total).

En fin, nos Confrères du Nord-Kivu nous ont maintenant exhibés leur Ordre de Mission dont copie en annexe.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Chef d'Antenne Minière de NUMBI mes sentiments les plus dévoués.

Pour le Secteur Minier de KALUNGU-MINOVA

[redacted]

The Group received the document from the South Kivu mining authorities in March 2018

Annex 27: Letter from SAKIMA, in which the entity claims ownership of untagged coltan (SMB, another entity, claims ownership of the same coltan)

SAKIMA SA

RCCM/CD/BKV/CCOM/14-B-0799
ID. NAT. A1200004W

Numéro Impôt : A1100005J
Numéro Impôt/Import : A0201-131000138 E/X

Bukavu, le 10/11/2017

N°/Ref : BKV/050 040/BUR/2017

13 11 2017 (2499)

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Chef de Division Provinciale des mines et Géologie à Bukavu
- Monsieur le Chef d'Antenne Provincial de SAEMAPE à Bukavu
- Monsieur le Coordonnateur Provincial de la cellule antifraude à Bukavu
- Monsieur le Directeur du CEEC à Bukavu
- Monsieur le Président de la FEC/Mines à Bukavu
- Monsieur le Président du Comité de Gestion de SAKIMA SA à Kinshasa

Concerne: Information sur un cas de fraude d'un lot de 2 300 kgs de Coltan interceptée à Kalungu

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre Provincial des Mines, Hydrocarbures et Environnement de la Province du Sud-Kivu

Excellence Monsieur le Ministre,

La Représentation SAKIMA SA/Sud Kivu vient par la présente vous tenir informé sur l'objet repris en exergue.

En effet, c'est depuis le début de l'année en cours que la SAKIMA SA Sud- Kivu a constaté la faible déclaration de la production de la filière Coltandère issue de ses sites miniers qualifiés et validés à Numbi dans le PE 2598 en territoire de Kalehe, qui ne correspond pas à la capacité de productivité au niveau d'activités sur terrain, ayant été informé sur l'activisme d'un réseau mafieux qui échappe au contrôle des services intervenants dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement en minerais de Numbi.

La SAKIMA SA en collaboration avec tous les autres services étaient à pied d'œuvre pour le démantèlement de ce réseau.

De ce fait, en date du 07/11/2017 nous avons été informés de l'interception d'un lot de 2.300kgs de Coltan qui a échappé à notre contrôle à Numbi et même à la chaine d'approvisionnement. Cette cargaison est revendiquée par l'entité de traitement SMB sous prétexte que ces produits venaient des sites du Nord Kivu au moment où tous minerais retrouvés à Kalungu viennent probablement du PE 2598 appartenant à SAKIMA SA.

Nous vous demanderions, Excellence Monsieur le Ministre Provincial d'instruire les services techniques en la matière afin de faire le suivi de ce dossier et remettre la SAKIMA SA dans ses droits dont le manque à gagner affectera même la Province.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre Provincial, l'assurance de notre haute considération.

Pour la Representation SAKIMA [redacted]

[redacted]

The Group received the document from the South Kivu mining authorities in March 2018

Annex 28: Letter from a *négociant* appealing to authorities to release his untagged minerals which were confisticated in Kalungu(the minerals were later released to the claimant)

[redacted]
EXPLOINTANT MINIER
DANS LA ZONE DE MASISI
[redacted]

Bukavu, le 14/../../2017



Transmis copie pour l'information à :

Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur de province du Sud-Kivu à BUKAVU
Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Mines, des Hydrocarbures et de l'Environnement du Sud-Kivu,
Monsieur le Directeur provincial du CEEC et coordonateur de la Commission de lutter contre la fraude minière de BUKAVU
Monsieur le chef division provinciale des Mines et Géologie du Sud-Kivu,
Monsieur le Commandant Escadron police des mines et Hydrocarbure ville de BUKAVU et point focal de la police des mines Sud-Kivu
(Tous à **BUKAVU**)

Objet : Réclamation de mes minerais 26 Colis saisis à partir de KALUNGU en date de 07/11/2017

A Monsieur l'auditeur supérieure de l'auditorat militaire de BUKAVU à BUKAVU.

Monsieur l'auditeur supérieur,

Par la présente j'ai l'honneur de venir auprès de votre haute personnalité pour réclamer mes 26 colis de minerais tel qu'il est signalé en marge.

En effet, moi étant exploitant dans la province du Nord-Kivu précisément à Masisi limitrophe de KALEHE avais découvert un nouveau site. Ayant cette qualité des minerais que je ne connais pas encore son minerai cause pour laquelle j'avais emballé ces 26 colis de différentes dimensions passant par KALEHE/KALUNGU qui semblent proche ce se cite plus que SAKE. Malheureusement juste en arrivant à KALUNGU les minerais étaient appréhendés sans tenir compte de ma destination.

Pour ce faire je sollicite de votre concours pour me remettre ces minerais, enfin que je puisse l'examiner à travers les spectreux de l'OCC, moi étant présent ici à BUKAVU à partir du vendredi 11/11/2017.

Espérant de vous une suite favorable, veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'auditeur supérieur, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus dévoués.

[redacted]

Propriétaire des minerais

The Group received the document from the South Kivu mining authorities in March 2018

Annex 29: DEADLY ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN BENI TERRITORY FROM 2 SEPTEMBER 2017 TO 8 APRIL 2018

List compiled by the Group on the basis of combined information from FARDC, MONUSCO eyewitnesses, actors of the civil society in Beni area and open sources

DATE	PLACE	TOTAL OF CIVILIANS KILLED
2017		
2 September 2017	Kbudukbudu (Mayangose)	3
7 October 2017	PK40 (Mbau/Kamango road)	26
26 October 2017	Boikene (Mayangose)	1
29 October 2017	PK20 (Mbau/Kamango road)	2
22 November 2017	PK17 (Mbau/Kamango road)	1
16 December 2017	PK22/PK23 (Mbau/Kamango road)	1
17 December 2017	Mamiki	1
TOTAL of civilians killed from 2 September to 17 December 2017:		**36**
2018		
11 January 2018	Rizerie/Semuliki Bridge (Beni/Kasindi road)	1
20 January 2018	Mayi Moya	1 (died of heart attack during the attack)
21 January 2018	Kokola	3
25 January 2018	Tungudu	1
2 February 2018	Kithevya	7
9 February 2018	Ngite	4
9 February 2018	Masulukwede/Vemba	4 (bodies found)
11 February 2018	Opira	2 (bodies found)
12 February 2018	Vemba	1 (body found)
17 February 2018	Tungudu (RN4)	7
19 February 2018	Kalinda Quarter, Beni Town	1 (body found)
22 February 2018	Mbau	2
25 February 2018	Kisiki	1
3 March 2018	Luna/Eringeti	6
5 March 2018	Mangolikene (south of Mayangose)	8
6 March 2018	PK16 (Mbau/kamango road)	2
13 March 2018	Nyaleke/Semuliki Bridge	3

	(Beni/Kasindi road)	
15 March 2018	Kididiwe	6
27 March 2017	Kasinga/Paida (Beni Town)	11
4 April 2018	Bunake (Eringeti)	1
TOTAL of civilians killed from 11 January to 4 April 2018:		**72**

Annex 30: Map of Beni territory, including the locations of attacks discussed in the repor.



Map edited by the Group of Experts

Annex 31: Motorbikes burnt during the PK40 massacre

Picture provided to the Group by a member of the civil society of Beni Territory

Annex 32: Lists of hostilities reported by the Lendu and Hema communities

A. List of hostilities reported by the Lendu community

1

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

ASSOCIATION CULTURELLE LORI

ACL-ASBL

COORDINATION DE DJUGU

LES EVENEMENTS QUI ENDEUILLENT LE PEUPLE BBALE DEPUIS L'ASSASSINAT DU PERE CARME FLORENT DUNJI

I. Introduction

Le Territoire de DJUGU est habité principalement par deux grandes tribus : les Lendu (Bhale) et les Hema. Celles-ci vivent en perpétuelles tensions souvent mal interprétées par beaucoup de gens ignorant la réalité. Ainsi, s'avère-t-il indispensable d'éclairer la lanterne de l'opinion publique tant nationale qu'internationale en leur fournissant non seulement le tableau chronologique des événements actuels et les observations y relatives mais aussi des propositions des solutions durables et capables de produire la paix.

II. Tableau chronologique des événements

N°	DATES	PROVOCATIONS HEMA	REACTIONS LENDU
		A) SECTEUR DES WALENDU/PITSI	
01	05/01/2017	Assassinat du Pere Carme Florent DUNJI au couvent de la Paroisse catholique de DRODRO, Diocese de BUNIA, par l'Abbé Cure NZINDJU Faustin, sujet Hema. Cet assassinat a fait l'objet de moquerie de tous les Lendu à travers des chansons traditionnelles et des discours des Hema.	Le cas a été déposé devant le Parquet de Grande Instance de l'Ituri à BUNIA. Le présumé assassin a été libéré. Les cadres Lendu ont peiné à calmer la Communauté à ne pas réagir.
02	16/12/2017	Un jeune homme du village TETE du Secteur des Walendu/PITSI a été tabassé et grièvement blessé au marché de UZI du Secteur des Walendu/DIATSI.	Deux jeunes gens du village TETE ont agressé deux jeunes filles hema du village MAZE.
03	17/12/2017	Incendie du Village TETE. 88 cases calcinées. Les HEMA sont venus de MAZE et de DHEDJA.	Les jeunes gens de TETE ont incendié le village TSUKI chez les HEMA.
04	17/12/2017	Il y a eu 4 fois de provocations par les HEMA venus de BLUKWA à DZENGELE au marché de DZUDDA : Qu'avez-vous fait quand nous avons tué votre prêtre, incendié ce marché et brûlé votre village TETE ?	Les Lendu n'ont pas répondu à ces attaques. Les soldats des FARDC et de PNC ayant leur position au marche de DZUDDA en sont témoins.
05	18/12/2017	Les Hema ont répété les mêmes menaces provocations au Marché de DZUDDA.	Les jeunes gens ont dû repousser les Hema.
06	19/12/2017	Les soldats des FARDC basés du côté Hema se sont permis d'ouvrir le feu sur les Lendu au Marché de DZUDDA à DZENGELE.	Les jeunes gens Bale n'ont rien fait, mais ils se sont rendus chez eux aux villages sans secours.
07	19/12/2017	Les fusillades ont été enregistrées dans le village GOLO, Groupement DHENDO.	Les Lendu ont ravi deux fusils dont les balles ont été tirées sur eux. Ces deux

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		Destruction de la culture de ma[illegible]ens le champ de RICHARD à JIBA/CHEGA par k[illegible]n de DDADDA.	fusils ont été remis au major MICHEL des FARDC dépêché de BULE.
08	10/01/2018	Le Président de la Société C[illegible] DRA de BULE a tenu une réunion qui devait dire l'arrivée des Bbale au Marché de BULE.	Les Lendu qui n'avaient pas entendu cette information se sont présentés au Marché de BULE.
09	11/01/2018	Arrestation de 8 mamans Lendu : ZIZINA, NESTORINE, TS'KA, KOKO, Jeanne TIINYO, TRIPHONNETTE, SHALO et NGABUSI venues au Marché de BULE, dont : SHALO, TRIPHONNETTE et Jeanne TIINYO sont portées disparues. ZIZINA, NESTORINE, TS'KA, KOKO et NGABUSI ont été libérées grâce à l'intervention du Chef de Chefferie des Hema Badjere et un certain SINGO.	Les Hema ont attendu en vain les réactions des Lendu.
10	Du 11 au 12/01/2018	Provocations contre les Lendu lancées des villages Hema, notamment LUTS'KO, KALISHA, KIJA en disant : « Vous Walendu, venez retirer le corps de votre TRIPHONNETTE que nous avons abattue ici ». Comme les Walendu ne venaient répliquer, ils ont traversé la limite pour s'introduire au village PETRO en lançant les mêmes mots de provocation et un combattant Hema a giflé et lapidé RAFA MAWA du village GOLO.	Aucune réaction
11	12/01/2018	MELCHIOR, un sujet Lendu, a été battu dans le village CHENDJI (DDADDA) par les Hema. Il s'est fracturé l'avant-bras. Les soldats de position l'ont sauvé.	Pas de réaction.
12	12/01/2018	Les Hema sont arrivés déclarer au village PETRO qu'ils ont tué le Père Carme Florent DUNDJI et ont demandé aux Lendu ce qu'ils ont fait en réaction.	Aucune réaction.
13	02/02/2018	Le reste des cases du village TFTE et celles de BUJU ont été incendiées par les jeunes du Groupement BUKU. Avant ces incendies, les femmes et les jeunes gens Lendu étaient souvent menacés et battus dans ce Groupement. Les Hema utilisaient chaque fois les soldats des FARDC et les PNC afin d'agir ensemble.	Fatigués par les provocations répétitives les Lendu ont incendié plusieurs villages Hema.
14	04/02/2018	Les soldats des FARDC venus de LARGU et BLUKWA, soit- disant l'équipe de sécurité, envoyés par S.E Monsieur le Gouverneur de l'ITURI, ont ouvert le feu sur les élèves de l'Institut de BLUKWA-MBII (chez les Walendu/PITSI) qui jouaient au jeu de dame.	Aucune réaction.
15	Du 05 au 19/02/2018	Les Hema du village NYIKPA ont abattu Maman CHARLOTTE du village MALO et M. R'KPA. Des maisons des Lendu ont été incendiées à GOBU-NDJII. Les Hema se sont moqués ouvertement de la tuerie des sujets Lendu de plusieurs villages au bord du Lac Albert.	Incendie des villages Hema du bord de Lac ALBERT.
15	10/02/2018	Incendie de 3 maisons dans le village DDIKPA (SAYO) au Groupement DHENDO, par les HEMA venus du Groupement DHENDRO. Le même jour les Hema du Village DDADDA, Groupement DHENDRO, accompagnés de 2 soldats	Les assaillants Hema ont été repoussés par les Lendu qui ont pourchassé les Hema jusqu'à la rivière LIVI, entre DHENDRO et BULE.

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/ECA/PIJ/ et 03/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux ; N°09/CAB/MIN/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

		FARDC, ont traversé à JIBA Village et ont tué un jeune du village NDJAJI. A l'instant, le Village TALIKPA a vu ses maisons incendiées par les miliciens HEMA accompagnés des FARDC venus de DHENDRO.	
16	...	Les Hema ont incendié le village VIDZA et LODYA (Groupement LINGA) et coupé à machette 3 Lendu qui s'étaient transportés à moto.	Le motocycliste est soigné à l'HGR RETHY. Les villages MOKE (NGOLOKPA), KAU et le village SUMBUSO ont été incendiés.
17	28/02/ 2018	Pillage du Centre de Santé de Référence de Blukwa-Mbi par les FARDC accompagnées des milices Hema. Toutes les portes ont été forcées y compris celles des bureaux des écoles primaires et secondaires	Aucune réaction
18	05/03/ 2018	Les soldats des FARDC accompagnés des Hema ont ouvert le feu sur les Lendu qui participaient à une séance de sensibilisation pour la paix au village MALALI, dans le Groupement LADDEDJO. Il y a eu 4 morts et 4 blessés.	Les Lendu ont repoussé les assaillants jusqu'au chef-lieu de chefferie des Bahema Nord.
19	06/03/ 2018	Les Hema, accompagnés des FARDC venant de BULE ont pillé au village PETRO : 1 mort, 2 blessés graves et 1 disparu.	Aucune réaction
20	11/03/ 2018	SUMBU, NJAZA, NGADJOLE tués à IGA/BARRIERE au retour d'un match de football de BUNIA à MONGBWALU/SAYO	-
		B) SECTEUR DES WALENDU TATSI	
21		Menace verbale de M. BUBU LENGA Constant en disant que les Hema vont faire une coalition avec le Gouvernement pour massacrer les peuples Lendu. Avant ce massacre, ils vont ordonner aux Hema de quitter les zones d'attaque.	Ce message d'un grand leader Hema a paniqué toute la communauté Lendu.
22	07/02/ 2018	Vers 19 heures, après le marché de Kparnganza, "il y a eu coups de balle tirés par un sujet Hema. Vendeur commerçant LOKPACHU, ce qui avait alerté le centre de Négoce. Après ces coups de balles, la même nuit il y a eu incendie des maisons à partir de KPARNGANZA jusqu'à SINGO et a embrasé les villages LONA et TOTO. Alors que la situation était calme sur l'ensemble du Secteur des W/Tatsi, cette situation a provoqué des vagues de banditisme et de pillage dans la région. Dans la situation de KPARNGANZA, les dégâts sont collatéraux.	Aucune réaction
23	15/02/ 2018	Arrestation arbitraire des 16 personnes au village LIDYO en Groupement SALIBOKO, pillage de plus des 100 chèvres, 5 motos et panneaux solaires, organisé par les jeunes Hema venu de LOGO accompagnés des militaires FARDC.	Aucune réaction
24	16/02/ 2018	La maison du chef de Groupement GOBI, Mr LOPA GOBI Richard a ete attaquée par les sujets HEMA venus de LOGO sous la houlette des FARDC. Ils ont tirés 2 coups de balle et ont pillé systématiquement	Aucune réaction

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/CCA/RU/ et GS/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux , N°09/CAB/MJK/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

		tous les biens de sa maison. Ici nous citons les noms de ces jeunes de LOGO, il s'agit de : LONDO LENGA qui détient l'arme à feu, GADO, LIRIPA et Emmanuel qui ne sont pas arrêtés jusqu'aujourd'hui et ces gens continuent à provoquer dans les villages.	
25	16/02/2018	A la même date, le chef de Secteur des Walendu Tatsi a été arrêté à KATOTO et menacé de mort par la population de KATOTO.	Aucune réaction
26	19/02/2018	Les villages MARIFA et SALIBOKO ont été attaqués par les sujets HEMA venus de TCHE toujours sous la houlette des FARDC. Du côté de la population de ces deux villages attaqués, il y a eu un cas de mort.	Au cours de cette attaque les jeunes de SALIBOKO se sont défendus (auto-défense) avec les flèches et ont réussi à repousser les assaillants jusqu'à identifier un certain LOKANA (sujet Hema) en tenue militaire.
27	03/03/2018	Attaque du village DHADHA bilan 2 cas de mort et ce même jour plusieurs villages du Groupement LOGA étaient en feu : LITA, KALANDA, JOMBE, ... incendiés par les jeunes de KATOTO.	Aucune réaction
28	03/03/2018	A la même date, il y a eu attentat d'assassinat de Mr LONA taximan de LIBA dans le Groupement MASUMBUKO par un assassin MAKI de LARGU sous la houlette de l'ancien Président des guérisseurs qui est actuel Chef de Cheffene des B/Nord Mr. PILO MULINDRO, heureusement ce dernier a été libéré de justesse par les militaires des FARDC de bonne foi.	Aucune réaction
29	06/03/2018	Attaque du village BBAU dans le Groupement LOGA, le bilan 4 morts et 7 blessés par les hommes venus en armes à feu, habillés en tenue militaire et les autres avec les salopettes de cantonniers distribués dans la région pour le cantonnage manuel de la route KATOTO-TALI. A la même date, les Hema venus du Groupement SALA ont incendié l'école primaire PENYI. Les militaires FARDC venus de TCHOMIA envoyés par les éleveurs HEMA ont incendié le village GOTCHUKPU en disant qu'ils étaient à la recherche de leurs vaches volées dans la région.	Aucune réaction
30	09/03/2018	Attaque du village BULO en Groupement GOBI par les HEMA venus de LARGU. Bilan : l'EP BULO incendiée ainsi qu'une partie du village BULO.	
		C) SECTEUR DES WALENDU/DJATSI	
31	09/02/2018	Vers 21 heures, incendie du village GOHU et Goba du Groupement Gokpa par les assaillants ressortissants de MAZE de chefferie de Bahema Nord, groupement Ndahura. Bilan : 65 cases brulées à GOHU et GOBA.	
32	10/02/2018	La suite d'incendie par les mêmes sujets des MAZE dans les mêmes villages.	
33	12/02/2018	Vers 21 heures : pillage dans la résidence de M. NDJABU MATESO par des hommes armés venus à	

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		bord de deux jeep, dans le village Jitso, en Groupement Fataki	
34	13/02/ 2018	Torture de deux hommes et une maman sur le tronçon reliant BB'ASA et GOKPA.	
35	16/02/ 2018	Deux sujets Lendu ont été abattus près de la rivière NIZI à IGA-Barrière.	
36	23/02/ 2018	Attaque du village JIPI et NDJAUDHA par les miliciens HEMA portant les armes à feu venu de DHEDJA, LID'A et UKPA. Bilan : un Vieux de 80 ans du nom de Fidèle et un jeune homme ont été abattus.	
37	29/02/ 2018	Incendie du village KISABU et TSEDHA dans le groupement SESELE par les sujets Hema venus de TSOTSO(LOPA).	
38	27/02/ 2018	Attaques du village Djokpa du Groupement DZ'NA par les assaillants Hema venus de TCHELE. Bilan : 1 Jeune homme BBALE décapité et 58 maisons incendiées.	
39	01/03/ 2018	Un jeune commerçant BBALE du nom de Richard est abattu dans la localité TSIZ' par les sujets Hema venus de.....	
40	02/03/ 2018	Le rapport de l'événement ci-dessus est diffusé sur la voie des ondes (RADIO CANDIP).	
41	03/03/ 2018	Attaque du village NDJALA par les sujets Hema venu de NYAPALA.	
42	04/03/ 2018	Deuxième attaque du village NDJALA par les mêmes sujet Hema du village NYAPALA. Bilan : quelques jeunes BBALE ont été blessés.	
43	06/03/ 2018	Assassinat d'une maman Lendu mariée à un sujet Hema sur le chemin de retour du marché de IGA Barrière vers NIZI par les jeunes de NIZI alors qu'elle était accompagnée de son mari, qui est rentré veuf chez lui.	
44	11/03/ 2018	A IGA Barrière, 2 jeunes BBALE revenant de Bunia, où ils étaient allés au match de football, pour Mungwalu, ont été décapités. Leur chauffeur taxi-moto, un sujet Lugbara, a été admis aux soins intensifs à l'HGR de BAMBU.	

III. Observations

1. Toutes les actions posées par les Lendu ne sont que des réactions aux provocations exactions perpétrées par les Hema accompagnés des soldats des FARDC qui sont déployés dans leurs entités contre les Lendu.
2. Les Hema n'ont jamais attaqué les Lendu seuls. Ils se font toujours appuyer, accompagner par des éléments visibles comme cités ci – haut et d'autres agissant dans l'ombre.
3. Les conflits ont été déclenchés par l'assassinat du Révérend Père Carme FLORENT DUNJI, Ministre de Dieu, suivi des rançonnements des populations Lendu, dans le village Hema, par les agents de l'ordre sur la route du marché UZI.

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4. Les Hema choisissent avec soin des accusations mensongères et fallacieuses, capables de choquer tout esprit, d'émouvoir à tel point qu'on est amené à condamner immédiatement les Bbale, sans vérifications préalables. On se réduit en croyant simplement sans le moindre doute, à tout ce que les Hema disent, même à des stupidités, sans se poser la question élémentaire d'un homme intellectuel : « Est- ce fondé, y a-t-il suffisamment de preuves ? ». On élève alors les Hema au rang des « petits dieux» dont les oracles sont reçus comme tels.
5. Produire beaucoup de bruits pour distraire les esprits de bonne foi qui cherchent à aborder objectivement les problèmes de DJUGU.
6. Ils font souvent des accusations projectives, c'est-à-dire quand ils font un mal, ils accusent les Bbale de le faire. Par exemple : Ils forment les milices hema en Ouganda et au chef-lieu des Bahema Banywagi à MANDRO. Les Walendu regrettent que l'Honorable TCHEDYA PATAY Raymond se permette de professer des mensonges en affirmant que les Walendu Pitsi forment leurs milices près de la Centrale Hydro électrique de KODA à KPANDROMA et dans la forêt de WAGO près de BLUKWA. Ces propos calomnieux ont été relayés sur toutes les chaînes des radios locales basées à BUNIA, tout en faisant la campagne d'incitation à la haine contre la communauté Lendu. Quels peuvent être des apports d'un tel représentant de peuple au Parlement pour la construction du pays ?

Voici d'autres exemples de leurs accusations :

- les Lendu préparent la guerre contre les Hema !
- les Lendu achètent des armes !
- les Lendu ont de camps où ils forment les milices !
- les Lendu tuent nos prêtres !
- Au secours ! Au secours ! Au secours ! Les Lendu nous attaquent! Gouvernement, frappez immédiatement ces « assaillants » avec « la dernière énergie, jusqu'à leur dernier retranchement » et en fermant les yeux (sans la moindre vérification).

L'homme sage, objectif et de bonne foi devra attentivement écouter toutes les accusations que les Hema portent contre les Lendu, ensuite les vérifier une à une en profondeur et en extension, chez les Hema avant tout, puis chez les Lendu après, parce qu'elles sont souvent projectives.

7. La communauté Hema s'entête à poser des actes illégaux, car l'Etat n'a ni poursuivi ni inquiété ni arrêté ces fauteurs jusqu'ici, depuis toujours.
8. Les conflits derniers ont commencé le 19 Juin 1999 et ont duré pendant cinq ans. Ils sont partis de problèmes des concessions foncières élargies frauduleusement par les sujets Hema. Le nombre des concessions se chiffre chez les Walendu Pitsi seuls à 152, Djatsi 28, Tatsi 17. Ces agrandissements des concessions ont englouti plusieurs villages Lendu d'où le pouvoir public déguerpissait les Lendu.

Procédures illégales utilisées :

a) Arrestations arbitraires des chefs locaux, des notables et surtout l'élite intellectuel et les hommes d'affaires Lendu, conduits au parquet et arrêtés en prison centrale dont certains y étaient morts ;

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b) Déguerpissement de la population par fusillade.

NB : - L'Etat laissait les concessionnaires libres d'agir.
- Jusqu'à ce jour, l'Etat n'a jamais enquêté ni jugé les concessionnaires. Par contre, l'Etat commence à renouveler leurs contrats d'emphytéose.
- Toutes ces concessions gérées par les Hema ont été transformées en centre d'entrainement des milices hema sous la formation des troupes étrangères : UPDF (Uganda) et APR (Rwanda). Cas des concessionnaires : SINGA KODJO, Thomas SAVO, LOBO TSORO, la liste n'est pas exhaustive.

La cause de tous les conflits qui opposent les Hema aux Lendu, clairement exprimée en public aux pourparlers de paix au Centre Culturel Interdisciplinaire C.C.I. NYAKASANZA à BUNIA, du 29/07 au 04/08/1999, est la conquête des terres habitées par les Walendu sur les flancs des Monts Bleus avec accès au Lac ALBERT. **A cette occasion les hema avaient déclaré la « cohabitation impossible » avec les Lendu.** Ils voulaient occuper seuls les portions déjà occupées par les Lendu. Un concessionnaire Hema, vers 1998 avait déclaré à ses bouviers, sujets Lendu : « Nous allons vous chasser au-delà de l'Uélé (rivière). », ce qui veut dire en dehors de l'Ituri.

Qui est responsable de conflit ? Celui qui fait la conquête (« déplace les bornes ») ou celui qui la subit ?

Les agrandissements frauduleux des concessions avaient engloutis plusieurs villages autour d'elles d'où la population devait partir forcément. Même une ferme collective avait été transformée, toujours frauduleusement, en une propriété privée d'un sujet hema. (Ce problème n'est pas résolu jusqu'à ce jour).

Pour conquérir les villages non atteints par les agrandissements des concessions, les hema ont suivi d'autre procédure. Les hema qui habitaient ces villages, au milieu des Lendu, bien sûr, ont commencé à jeter des tracts qu'ils ont rédigés au nom des LENDU avec le contenu suivant : « Vous, les hema, vous devez quitter nos villages, vous devez rentrer chez vous, sinon vous allez voir. »

Ils ont alors porté plainte contre les Lendu auprès du chef des Bahema-Nord à Blukwa, Kpadhingu Londri au lieu du Chef des Secteur des Walendu Pitsi dont ils sont dans la juridiction. Ils accusaient les Lendu de les chasser de leurs villages à travers des tracts. Le jeudi 17 juin 1999, le Chef KPADHINGO LONDRI s'est déporté dans le village MOKPA de Pitsi à l'insu du chef de Secteur. Mais quand la vérité, qui toujours est toute-puissante, menaçait de sortir en lavant les Lendu, il a brusquement interrompu l'enquête, ne voulant plus jamais continuer et il la remporta malignement pour le samedi, 19/6/1999. Mais la même nuit, les Hema ont incendié une de leurs maisons abandonnée. Ils en ont de nouveau accusé les Lendu pour profiter le samedi à les attaquer dans le village voisin LOKEMA alors qu'ils s'attendaient à continuer l'enquête. Armés de fusils, ils ont surpris ceux qui étaient dans une maison de deuil et ont fait beaucoup de morts dont la première victime était la maman ONOSIATA, fille Lendu, épouse d'un sujet hema, en attente de la maternité. La guerre avait été déclarée.

L'Etat n'a pas intervenu. Mais poussé irrésistiblement par la force de la haute diabolisation quotidienne du Chef du secteur des Walendu Pitsi et de ses notables de la part des Hema, il a plutôt commencé à chercher à arrêter ces leaders Lendu pour la justice (Parquet) et pour impitoyablement les limoger, les remplacer. Pourquoi dans la chaîne d'autorités qui se

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/CCA/MJ/ et GS/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux ; N°09/CAB/MIN/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

superposent, on choisit les chefs de Secteur des Lendu ? Ce problème ne concerne-t-il pas toutes ces autorités ?

9. Il est évident que les hema ont fait de haute coopération. Ils ont formé librement leurs troupes à l'étranger, les ont fait pénétrer librement dans le pays, pour opérer librement. Ils ont consenti de gros moyens, certainement, moyens qu'on ne peut rassembler en un jour, l'objectif poursuivi étant élevé.
10. Dans des actions de sécurité menées par les agents de l'ordre en Ituri, la Communauté Lendu a toujours été un objet d'injustice. Dans la situation sécuritaire qui prévaut actuellement dans le Territoire de DJUGU, les Hema portent des armes blanches et de guerre tandis que les Lendu sont coincés, obligés de ne rien détenir. Les soldats déployés pour la sécurité tirent des balles sur les Lendu qui portent les machettes pour aller au champ.
11. Les agents de la police, nouvellement affectés à Kpandroma font des tirs sporadiques, dont un des coups dans la maison d'une maman Hema, a risqué de causer la perte en vie humaine. Les rumeurs font entendre que ces agents de l'ordre ont comme mission de déclencher le trouble de l'ordre public à Kpandroma par des menaces et des fusillades qu'ils ont déjà commencées. D'autres rumeurs courent que, même si l'on déploie les agents de l'ordre chez les Lendu, ce n'est pas pour les protéger, mais pour protéger toujours les Hema.
12. Les militaires déployés à LARGU, BLUKWA, BULE (milieux Hema) sont mêlés de jeunes Hema, vêtus en tenues militaires : équation compliquée.
13. Dans les conflits derniers, les Hema ont tout fait pour placer en tête de la Province un sujet Hema, la maman LOTSOVE MUGISA Adèle. Alors les conflits ont pris une allure terrifiante. Comme les conflits suivent toujours le même schéma, cette fois-ci, si par ruse ou par force les hema remplacent le Gouverneur de la Province de l'Ituri par un sujet Hema, c'est qu'ils ont résolu de donner aux conflits une allure de grande envergure.
14. Les Hema tuent innocemment les rares prêtres Bbale qui parviennent à ce niveau à travers des épines touffues que leur dressent les hema, dans tous leur parcours et même dans leur carrière, au vu et au su de leur Dieu. Pour s'en féliciter et pour s'en réjouir, ils en composent des chansons moqueuses qu'ils aiment bien savourer. Leur cruauté dépasse le paroxysme.
    Deux Révérends Pasteurs Protestants, sujets Hema, s'entretenant entre eux ont dit dans leur dialogue : « Si vraiment Dieu existe, ce que nous faisons contre les Lendu ne nous permettra jamais d'entrer dans le Royaume des Cieux. »
15. Ayant vécu dans une impunité continue, les Hema ont perdu la notion du mal. Tout leur est bien. En conséquence, ils ont l'audace de poser n'importe quelle action, pas seulement envers les Lendu mais aussi envers n'importe qui, à n'importe quel niveau, même envers ceux qui croient les favoriser ou être leur ami intime. Les Lendu, leurs oncles, étaient leurs premiers amis, les plus intimes au Congo.
    A titre d'illustrations :
    a) ils ont, eux-mêmes, tué à KASENYI leur propre frère et ont ramené en exposition le corps dans la ville de BUNIA afin de déchainer la colère de la population Hema et de l'Etat pour frapper immédiatement les Lendu qu'ils accusaient d'être responsables de cet acte criminel. Ils se fondaient sur la vérité que l'Etat ne prend pas soin de mener les enquêtes pour vérifier les multiples accusations qu'ils portent contre les Lendu. Dans cette conviction aussi, comme ils en ont l'art, ils diabolisent intensément les chefs et la

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/CCA/RIJ/ et GS/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux ; N°09/CAB/MJK/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

population Lendu. Toutes ces diabolisations c'est pour faire croire davantage qu'il ne vaut pas la peine de vérifier les accusations portées contre les Lendu, mais tout simplement de les frapper avec la dernière énergie.

b) Ils ont lapidé Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur de la Province de l'Ituri à Blukwa et à Bunia.

16. Ils ont des stratégies subtiles capables de gagner les esprits et réduire même les grandes personnalités à leur service jusqu'au service odieux.

17. Voici quelques points relevés du TOP SECRET, trouvé à RULE/SUMBOSO, un village Hema. Ce document est intitulé « PROCEDURE DE LA GUERRE DE CONQUETE DES BAHEMA AU CONGO » :

- L'équation de cette guerre est très compliquée, car la procédure est très longue ...
- Exterminer tous les hommes influents et ceux qui ont les possibilités financières ...
- Massacrer les jeunes congolais par prison, exercices lourds et travaux forcés ...
- Exterminer les autorités coutumières et locales pour affaiblir le pouvoir coutumier et des guerriers traditionnels
- S'attaquer aux intellectuels congolais partout où ils sont pour les affaiblir par torture, famine, enlèvement ...
- Brûler tous les villages ...
- Occasionner la famine dans les villages qui entraînent les guerriers en détruisant l'intérieur c'est-à-dire les territoires qui ravitaillent, il faut priver de l'eau et du courant si possible ...
- Détruire les archives pour effacer l'histoire et tous les documents de référence sur les réalités du Congo.
- Affaiblir le secteur santé, le non accès aux soins de santé en désorganisant les agents spécialiste de santé (médecins) ainsi que les organismes internationaux de la santé.

18. Lors d'une visite des notables Lendu chez M. BUBU LENGA Constant, notable Hema, à la surprise de tout le monde, il a gravement déclaré ce qui suit : « **Il n'y a rien à négocier avec les Lendu. Les FARDC et les milices Hema seront utilisés ensemble pour massacrer les Lendu. Par conséquent tous les hema doivent évacuer le Territoire de DJUGU car tous ceux qui se trouveront sur terrain seront bombardés. L'actuelle guerre sera entre le Gouvernement et les Lendu.** » Il a lui-même organisé l'évacuation de la population Hema en véhicules et en barques respectivement vers Bunia et l'Ouganda au vu et au su de tout le monde y compris le pouvoir en place.

19. Les prêtres Hema ont porté la tenue militaire sous la soutane et menacé les chrétiens Lendu dans leurs homélies. Ils ont, en 1999, réquisitionné le véhicule du Diocèse de Bunia dans l'opération militaire pour massacrer leurs chrétiens Lendu et tous les membres de leurs communauté en trois jours. Ils ont, le 5 juin 2017, tué au couvent de DRODRO le père carme FLORENT DUNJI.

20. Jusqu'aujourd'hui, les Lendu continuent à héberger et protéger les pauvres déplacés Hema au Chef-lieu du Secteur Walendu Pitsi à LIBI, à GODJOKA, à KPANDROMA etc.

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/CCA/RU/ et GS/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux , N°09/CAB/MJS/94 du 24 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

IV. Pistes des solutions

A. Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur de la Province de l'Ituri

1. Interdire aux radios de faire la campagne d'incitation à la haine contre la communauté Lendu ;
2. Vérifier si le curé assassin est en prison ; s'il n'y est pas, « frapper avec la dernière énergie » cette justice qui, comme toujours entretient les conflits qui font couler le sang dans le Territoire de Djugu prenant le plaisir à libérer les malfaiteurs, mais jeter en prison, même pour y mourir, les pauvres innocents ;
3. Vérifier dans la fraîcheur :
   a) Les camps de formation signalés par l'Honorable TCHEDYA PATAY Raymond à KODA et dans la forêt de WAGO.
   b) Les camps de formation de milices à MANDRO et en Ouganda par KAWA MANDRO PANGA du parti PUSIC, avec leur débarquement à TCHOMIA, le 6 février 2018.
   c) Le projet de balkanisation de la RDC par M. KAWA PANGA MANDRO hautement instrumentalisé par ses partenaires ougandais et rwandais et très présent sur les réseaux sociaux.

B. Au Gouvernement Central

4. Former promptement une équipe objective et impartiale qui doit aller sur terrain, mener l'enquête :
   a) Sur les concessions ;
   b) Pour analyser avec grand soin quand, comment, où et par qui se déclenchent les conflits entre Hema et Lendu depuis 1999 et opèrent jusqu'à ce jour ;
   c) Pour trouver ceux qui ont opéré en 1999 et y opèrent encore ;
   d) Pour analyser les solutions qui ont apporté les accalmies, cette paix fragile...
   e) Pour publier le résultat et remettre à la justice les coupables ;
   f) Pour enfin, envisager les solutions se dégageant logiquement des résultats fournis par les enquêtes menées sur terrain.
5. Enquêter pour rendre justice réellement sur les allégations des personnalités suivantes :
   1° Constant BUBU LENGA : Président de FEC/ITURI, Commerçant
   2° Raymond TCHEDYA PATAY . Député national
6. Organiser une conférence de pacification de l'Ituri ainsi que celle de vérité et réconciliation en Territoire de Djugu.

Arrêté Ministériel N°1117/CCA/BU/ et CA/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux ; N°09/CAB/MJK/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

C. A l'Eglise Catholique

7. Que les paroisses catholiques dans les Secteurs Lendu soient dirigées par les missionnaires carmes.

V. Conclusion

Environ 60 ans après l'indépendance, nous nous contentons de bâtir le pays sur le sable en mobilisant nos medias dans la campagne d'incitation à la haine des citoyens entre eux, de voir la justice commettre l'injustice, l'administration baigner dans la corruption et la partialité, les intellectuels réfléchir comme des analphabètes et enfin l'Eglise prêcher « un autre évangile », celui de la violence.

Fait à Kpandroma, le 13 mars 2018

Pour la Communauté Bbale,

Le Président de l'Association Culturelle LORI ai WALENDU/PITSI

M. JEROME NDJANGO NDALO

Arrêté Ministériel N°111?/CCA/RIJ/ et GS/96 du 10 décembre 1996 du Ministère de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux ; N°09/CAB/MJR/94 du 28 mars 1994 du Ministère de la Jeunesse Culture et Arts. Acte d'existence n°47/86 du 26 octobre 1986 de l'Hôtel de la ville de Kinshasa

B. List of hostilities reported by the Hema community

RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
PROVINCE DE L'ITURI
TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU
CHEFFERIE DES BANDORO NORD

BILAN DE CATASTROPHE EN CHEFFERIE DES BANDORO NORD DEPUIS LE 20.12.2017 AU 23.02.2018 PAR LES MILICIENS LENDU (MASSACRES - INCENDIES - PILLAGES)

Nº	Groupement	Nombre des personnes massacrées	Nombre des personnes blessées	Nombre des maisons incendiées	Nombre des bétails pillés		Nombre des villages incendiés	Observation
					Gros bétails	Petits bétails		
01	BULA	20	1	1723	405	1856	30	
02	UTSHA	55	7	351	14	206	11	
03	DJUGU	13	24	746	34	2239	34	
04	LUANGIBE	6	-	401	41	341	6	
05	LOGA NZEBA	42	12	1013	306	2401	96	
06	KPACHU	11	6	105	12	607	16	
07	BANDORO	43	16	1516	67	2405	24	
08	SONDUSU	115	34	2016	428	4156	97	
09	MALOBO	4	21	101	64	673	6	
10	SINGO	12	9	670	76	526	22	
11	NGANDA BELEMO	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	TOTAL	403	134	9039	4231	14451	439	

FAIT À BUNIA, LE 23.02.2018
LE CHEF DE CHEFFERIE DES BANDORO NORD
NGBA. HUGO. MULINGBA
CHEF COUTUMIER

Annex 33: Agreement to cease hostilities signed by leaders of the Lendu and Hema communities in mid-March 2018

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR ET SECURITE

PROVINCE DE L'ITURI

TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU

ACTE D'ENGAGEMENT DES CHEFS DES SECTEURS ET DES CHEFFERIES DU TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU EN VUE DE LA CESSATION IMMEDIATE DES HOSTILITES COMMUNAUTAIRES DECLENCHEES DEPUIS LE MOIS DE DECEMBRE 2017

ACTE D'ENGAGEMENT DES CHEFS DES SECTEURS ET DES CHEFFERIES DU TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU EN VUE DE LA CESSATION IMMEDIATE DES HOSTILITES COMMUNAUTAIRES DECLENCHEES DEPUIS LE MOIS DE DECEMBRE 2017

Nous, Chefs de Secteurs et Chefferies du Territoire de Djugu, en Province de l'Ituri ;

Ayant constaté les massacres de nos populations civiles et des incendies des villages à grande échelle depuis la deuxième quinzaine du mois de décembre 2017 dans le Territoire de Djugu, occasionnant ainsi les déplacements massifs des populations civiles de leur milieu de vie naturelle dans les familles d'accueil et dans des camps des déplacés créés à cette fin à Bunia, ailleurs et à l'étranger ;

Constatant les conditions humanitaires précaires dans lesquels vivent nos populations respectives, notamment les personnes vulnérables : les vieillards, les femmes enceintes, les enfants, les malades, etc. ;

Considérant que toutes les activités administratives territoriales, sociales et économiques sont globalement paralysées dans le Territoire de Djugu, à savoir le travail des bureaux des entités territoriales, le commerce, les formations médicales fermées et surtout la fermeture des écoles, mettant ainsi en péril l'avenir de la jeunesse, pépinière humaine de notre cher Territoire ;

Considérant la position géographique stratégique du Territoire de Djugu qui se trouve au centre de la Province de l'Ituri et partage les limites administratives non seulement avec tous les quatre autres territoires de notre Province (ARU, MAHAGI, IRUMU et MAMBASA), mais encore avec la Province voisine du Haut Uele, étant frontalier au Territoire de WATSA ;

Considérant que, partant de sa position géographique, la déstabilisation du Territoire de Djugu entrainera ipso facto la déstabilisation de toute la Province de l'Ituri ;

Soucieux de ce que les conditions de vie sociale de nos populations respectives reviennent à la normale, pour que tout le monde et chacun vaque normalement à ses occupations habituelles pour l'essor de notre nouvelle Province de l'Ituri que nous avons tant reclamée et qui est une réalité à ce jour ;

Eu égard à tout ce qui précède ;

PRENONS A TEMOIN ET DECLARONS :

- Devant toutes les communautés du Territoire de Djugu ;
- Devant toutes les communautés de la Province de l'Ituri ;
- Devant toutes les communautés Nationales de la République Démocratique du Congo ;
- Devant toute la Communauté Internationale ;
- Devant Dieu et le monde ;

1. Prenons l'engagement ferme de nous impliquer activement dans la cessation immédiate des hostilités dans nos entités territoriales respectives ;
2. Pour ce faire, nous nous engageons d'une part à dénoncer toutes les personnes qui s'attaquent aux paisibles populations civiles et à leurs biens ; et d'autre part, à appuyer tous les services spécialisés de l'Etat en charge de maintien de la tranquillité et de l'ordre public, à savoir la Police Nationale, les FARDC, les différents services de sécurité et la Justice ;
3. Prenons le ferme engagement de faciliter la libre circulation des personnes et de leurs biens sur toute l'étendue du Territoire de Djugu, plus particulièrement à travers les axes vitaux ci-après :
    1) Tchomia – Kafé – Tché – Largu ou Katoto – Kparnganza – Saliboko – Masumbuko – Largu-Drodro – Mazee aussi Largu-Blukwa-Mbi-Dhedja-Bule.
    2) Bunia – Makpo – Iga-Barrière
        * Nizi – Kobu – Kilo – Mongbalu – Mbidjo – Makofi
        * Nizi – Zibiti – Panduru – Gele/Mabanga – Tchele
        * Iga/Barrière – Lopa – Jina – Pimbo – Djugu – Fataki allant vers Sanduku – Libi – Dhera et Sanduku – Kpandroma
    3) Kobu – Tchudja – Dix Zaire – Dala
    4) Jina – Juli – Mbau – Tchele – Mangale – Dzu'dda
    5) Likopi – Djugu
    6) Fataki – Bule – Dhedja – Blukwa
    7) Dhedja – Maze – Drodro – Largu
    8) Nizi – Bakombe – Dz'na – Tchele
    9) Blukwa – Juba – Bubba – Kpandroma ;
    10) Bunia – Nyangaray – Bengwe – Kilo
    11) Bunia – Lipri – Bambu ;
    12) Mongwalu – Pluto – Lodjo – Yedi.

Ainsi fait en âme et conscience.

LES CHEFS DES SECTEURS ET DES CHEFFERIES DU TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU,

N°	PRENOM, NOM & POSTE-NOM	ENTITE TERRITORIALE	N° DE TELEPHONE	LIEU, DATE ET SIGNATURE
01	Emilie LONGBE TCHABI LIBI	WALENDU-PITSI	081038887 ; 0829732471	
02	Chrysante LOTULE IINGUNGA RISASI	BAHEMA-BAGURU	0810132471	
03	Freddy MBIDJO MANDRO PANGA	BAHEMA-BANYWAGI	0813002636	
04	Richard DHEDA KONDO LENGA	BAHEMA-BADJERE	0811343994 ;	
05	Innocent MADUKADALA KOSSIANDEY	BANYALI-KILO	0822701999 ; 0895276475	
06	Claude MATESO MBUTCHU	WALENDU-DJATSI	0823999972	
07	Jean DZ'BA BANDJI	NDO OKEBO	0812241440	
08	Faustin LIKPA ADRUGESE	MABENDI	0815003085	
09	Joël MANDE LOMEMA	WALENDU-TATSI	0817100809 ; 0813613896	
10	Henri JUGA TCHELE IGILO	MAMBISA	0817193853 ; 0827506641	
11	Willy PILO MULINDRO	BAHEMA-NORD	0817277816 ; 0810905707	

Annex 34: Aerial view of Semuliki COB

Picture provided by an FARDC Officer

Annex 35: RPG found in a tree on the southern side of the Semuliki COB on the Semuliki River

Photo taken by the Group during its field visit to Semuliki COB on 25 January 2018

Annex 36: Pictures of the Semuliki COB damages

One of the five burnt tents

One of the five burnt tents



One of five burnt tents

Photos taken by the Group during its field visit to Semuliki COB on 25 January 2018

Burnt APC and burnt truck with western part of the COB in the background

Burnt APC

Bullets' impacts on the UN mobile water treatment unit

Photos taken by the Group during its field visit to Semuliki COB on 25 January 2018

Annex 37: Weapons seized from Mai-Mai Yakutumba and displayed in Uvira and list of materiel collected from Mai-Mai Yakutumba

Photo by FARDC in February 2018

- 03 RPG 7
- 04 BOMBES RPG 7
- 04 BOMBES 107/m
- 01 Mo.60
- 01 BTB/107mm
- 03 MACHINES ORBORDS
- 01 CANNON 7 75 ou SPG9
- 03 BOMBES Mo.82mm
- 01 BIPIED 107mm
- 01 BACH

04 mitrailleuses ; n° 711857, 840494, 708461

MAG TYPE BEI GE n° 0321

- 404 Mun 7,62mm x 51
- 2562 coups 7,62 mm x 54
- 920 coups 7,62mm x 39
- 172 coups 12,7 mm

1. AKA56 M70A8276441
2. AKA 47 n° 1170131
3. AKA 56 n° 563866604
4. AKA47 n° 1974-66734
5. AKA47 n° 563815922
6. AKA n° 264054
7. AKA 56 n°18027
8. AKA 56 n° 87341
9. AKA 56 n° 8097
10. AKA 56 n° 09805
11. AKA 47 n° 1969-TX4793
12. AKA 47 n° 0983(pièce mobile)
13. AKA 56 n° 3605274
14. AKA 56 n° 3732613
15. AKA 56 n° 4122057
16. AKA 56 n° 37009575
17. AKA 56 n° 1158(pièce mobile)
18. AKA 56 n° 353534159
19. AKA 47 n° 1966452
20. AKA 47 n° 1965M876
21. AKA 56 n° 79729(couvercle)
22. AKA 56 sans n° (carcasse)
23. AKA 56 n° 35031855
24. AKA 47 n° 4812P (carcasse)
25. AKA 56 n° 3600563
26. M.16 carcasse sans n°
27. AKA 56 n° 1853(pièce mobile)
28. RPD n° 1971-00-0997
29. 01 Grenade (type ananas)

List received from the FARDC with annotation of the Group in February 2018

Annex 38: 107mm "Bi-tube" multiple rocket launcher type 63

Photos by the Group in March 2018

Annex 39: 75mm Recoilless Rifle (Cannon sans recul) similar to M20 and mortar

Photos provided by FARDC in February 2018



Sample of 75 mm, Source:
https://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.asp?smallarms_id=548



Photo by the Group in February 2018

Annex 40: 7.62x54Rmm Machine Gun model MG-1M



Photos provided by Monusco/FARDC in March 2018

Annex 41: Samples of 7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 54 mm ammunition collected from armed groups and under investigation by the Group of Experts

7.62x39R

RA_53

FN_66





188_87

Photos by the Group in February 2018



945_06

945_07

BN_40_2

671_54.6



71_06

Photos by the Group in February 2018



LC_67







10_96

41_97

Photos by the Group in February 2018



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

188- Д



SU_1_S1_01

Photos by the Group in February 2018

7.62x54R



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

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71_71

Photos by the Group in February 2018



82MB-HE *20*-08-62

Photo by the Group in February 2018

Annex 42: 73 mm Round RHEAT-9MA



Photos by the Group in March 2018

Annex 43: Sample of new uniforms, bullet-proof vests and helmets delivered in October 2017

Photos provided by FARDC in February 2018

Annex 44: China Xinxing Shanghai Import and Export Corporation Bill of Lading

PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES (PTE) LTD

(Incorporated in Singapore)

PORT-TO-PORT OR COMBINED TRANSPORT BILL OF LADING

CHINA XINXING SHANGHAI IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORATION NUMBER 41, TONGHING ROAD, HONGKOU DISTRICT, 200083, SHANGHAI, *

ATTENTION MUSONGORI GUY, REINSEIGNEMENT MILITAIRE, NO.10, AVENUE BIKORO, COMMUNE DE NGALIEMA VILLE, KINSHASA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.**

ATTENTION MUSONGORI GUY, REINSEIGNEMENT MILITAIRE, NO.10, AVENUE BIKORO, COMMUNE DE NGALIEMA VILLE, KINSHASA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.***

CHI CON TITUS 26389

SHANGHAI

MATADI

SHANGHAI

KINSHASA

Zero (0)

PARTICULARS AS DECLARED BY SHIPPER - BUT WITHOUT REPRESENTATION AND NOTATION AND NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY CARRIER

Description of Goods	Gross Weight	Measurement
396 CARTONS	6400 KGS	37.870 CBM

SAID TO CONTAIN:
300 CARTONS IN TOTAL
BULLETPROOF HELMET 1000 PIECES
BULLETPROOF JACKET 1000 PIECES
*CHINA
CONTACT PERSON:MASON YAO
HOW:+86 182 17123275
***TEL: +243999999120
***TEL: +243999999120

Container No.	Seal No.	Size/Ty	Qty	Pkg Type	Weight	Measure
TCNU1672457 (CY/CY)	WSP95536	40HC	396	CARTONS	6400	37.870

SHIPPER'S LOAD STOW COUNT & SEAL

FREIGHT & CHARGES

FREIGHT PREPAID

Received by the Carrier from the Shipper in external apparent good order and condition, unless otherwise indicated, the total number or quantity of Containers or other packages or other customary freight units specified as "Total Number of Containers received by the Carrier" on the face hereof for Carriage subject to all the terms and conditions hereof (INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF AND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CARRIER'S APPLICABLE TARIFF) from Place of Receipt or the Port of Loading, whichever is applicable, to Place of Delivery or Port of Discharge, whichever is applicable. Weights, measurements, marks, numbers, quantity, contents and value if mentioned hereof are to be considered unknown by the Carrier

PLACE & DATE OF ISSUE

DATE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the number of original bills of lading stated above of this tenor and date has been signed. One of which being accomplished the others to stand void.

Signed for the Carrier

PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES (PTE) LTD

Agent's Address at Destination:

Total number of containers or packages received by the Carrier

THREE CONTAINER(S) ONLY

Photo by the Group in February 2018

Annex 45: Materiel with characteristics similar to that produced in Egypt



B. MUNITIONS

N°	NOMENCLATURE	U/M	Qté REÇUE	Année de fabrication	Obs
01	Cart 7,62 x 39mm Ball	Cps	1.000.000	1984	
02	Cart 7,62 x 39mm Trarç	Cps	250.000	1982	
03	Cart 7,62 x 39mm Blank	Cps	500.000	1984	
04	Cart 7,62 x 54mm Ball	Cps	1.000.000	1980	
05	Cart 7,62 x 54mm Trarç	Cps	250.000	1979	
06	Cart 7,62 x 54mm Blank	Cps	250.200	2000	
07	Cart 12,7mm API	Cps	500.100	1971	
08	Cart 12,7mm API-T	Cps	250.200	1961-1971	
09	Cart 14,5mm API	Cps	15.130	1968-1985	
10	Cart 14,5 API-T	Cps	10.080	Idem	
11	Cart à Obus 30mm	Cps	15.090	1958	
12	Bombes Mor 60mm HE	Cps	3.500	1982	
13	Bombes Mor 82mm HE	Cps	3.510	1972	
14	Obus 100mm HE	Cps	1.500	1971	
15	Obus 122mm HE D30	Cps	1.000	1984	
16	Roq 122mm BM-21	Cps	700	Années différentes	

DESC (www.desc-wondo.org), April 2018

Annex 46: Arms, ammunition and medicine recovered from RED Tabara combatants by FARDC







Photos provided by FARDC in March 2018

Annex 47: REDTabara combatants intercepted by FARDC in South Kivu

"Maj General Birembu Melkiade, CoS/Red Tabara

Photos provided by FARDC, annotation by the Group in March 2018